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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The Objective of the Thesis 
Mr Shah1 immigrated to the United States in the 1980s. With a bachelor’s degree in 
engineering from India, an MBA from a local university, and extensive experience in a 
Boston high-tech firm, he launched his own software firm along Route 128 in 1994….  
 
This is the story of one of the new Indian entrepreneurs in the Boston high-technology 
sector. Mr Shah and his fellow Indian entrepreneurs diverge from earlier entrepreneurs of 
minority background who have concentrated in low-technology industries such as 
construction, garment manufacturing, food wholesalers, restaurants and gas stations. 
(Aldrich & Waldinger 1995, Waldinger, 1995, Ward et al 1995, Light 2000). The new 
Indian entrepreneurs also drastically differ from entreprenurs in ethnic enclaves (i.e. 
Chinatown, Little Cuba and Korea town) where minorities traditionally have clustered to 
organize a variety of enterprises to serve their own ethnic market. The extensive scholarly 
literature that has documented the presence of minority entrepreneurs in general, and 
immigrant entrepreneurs in particular, has followed the traditional sectoral concentration 
of these ethnic groups. In other words, the rich theoretical framework set fourth on ethnic 
entrepreneurship has solely been based on research carried out in spatially clustered 
arenas and marginalized low-skilled sectors. This theoretical framework has cemented 
the distinctiveness of ethnic entrepreneurship. Advocates of this framework have pointed 
out that ethnic minorities express different motives than the mainstream for pursuing 
entrepreneurship. More importantly, they also highlight the fact that entrepreneurs of 
minority background adopt distinctive social tie-strategies when developing, managing 
and maintaining a business enterprise. The outsider status of these ethnic groups 
intensifies close ties of loyalty among group members and helps to foster ethnic 
solidarity, mutual trust and cooperation. Accordingly, scholars have claimed that ethnic 
minorities tend to be overreliant on ethnic social ties when mobilizing the resources 
                                                 
1 The name of the entrepreneur is ficticous 
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needed to run a business. Scholars, however, actually know very little about the strategies 
of minority entrepreneurs like Mr Shah, who have entered the most technologically 
sophisticated sectors of the economy. The distinctive ethnic tie-strategy that minority 
entrepreneurs in low-skilled sectors have adopted may not necessarily apply to their 
counterparts in knowledge intensive sectors. Thus, the assumptions surrounding the tie-
strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs must be considered biased and incomplete. 
Therefore, the primary objective of this study is to take one step towards making 
ethnic entrepreneur theory more complete by focusing attention on the social tie-
strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs in a knowledge intensive sector. A tie-strategy is 
defined as an actor’s pattern of action reflecting how he positions himself to others in 
order to accomplish his goals (Aldrich & Waldinger 1990). Following from this 
definition, I intend to pursue the objective of this thesis by exploring the type and the 
nature of the social ties that Asian Indian entrepreneurs have formed, and are making use 
of, in the daily operations of their firm. Furthermore, I will focus on the individual 
purposeful action of Indian entrepreneurs embedded in a unique and historically specific 
opportunity structure, namely the Boston high-technology (high-tech) sector. The 
opportunity structure refers to the economic, technological, socio-economic and socio-
ethnic structures of a specific context which produces a set of possible courses of action. 
In fact, earlier studies on ethnic entrepreneurship have demonstrated that the 
characteristics of the opportunity structure are crucial for understanding the strategies of 
ethnic entrepreneurs (Ward et al 1993, Aldrich & Waldinger 1995). This is because 
ethnic entrepreneurs can work only with resources made available to them by their 
immediate and external environment. Structural features of the environment may also 
impede entrepreneurs from pursuing certain tie-strategies.  
When researching the social ties that Indian entrepreneurs in a knowledge 
intensive sector adopt to mobilize resources, I will combine the insights from inter-
organizational and social network theory. While inter-organizational theory emphazises 
firm-to-firm relations, social network theory highlights the inter-personal ties of the 
entrepreneur. When used in conjunction, these two network theories provide a more 
holistic approach for examining the connections Asian Indians make use of in the daily 
operations of their firm. I have constructed four research questions that capture the type 
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of connections at use, and the detailed characteristics of these ties. Particularly, the 
questions take into consideration the influence of structural impediments in the context 
that will be thoroughly discussed in the background chapters and elaborated on in the 
theoretical framework. They also allow me to look into how the unique experiences of 
the entrepreneurs, as well as the technological specialization of their firms have shaped 
the type of connections at use. Finally, the questions enable me to examine the degree of 
ethnicity at play (if any) in the Indian entrepreneurs’ pattern of actions. It is plausible that 
the ethnic composition of the sector in connection with the knowledge intensive nature of 
the high-tech industry may weaken the importance of co-ethnic social ties. In order to 
consider these issues, I have formulated the main research question as following: 
 
1) What kind of ties have Indian entrepreneurs adopted in order to stay competitive in 
Boston’s high-tech sector? 
 
The first subquestion recognizes the particular power structure that characterizes the 
Boston high-tech community. Specifically, the community has been marked by a puritan 
industrial tradition where membership has been based on family and class background. 
Moreover, the numerous recessions that have hit the Boston high-tech sector have, 
curiously, strengthened the dominanace of the established power elite. Therefore, I will 
take into account the high-tech community’s degree of openness when researching the 
connections that the Indian entrepreneurs employ. Accordingly, I ask:    
 
a) Have Indian entrepreneurs managed to integrate a) spatially and b) socially into the 
local, established high-tech network? 
 
The second subquestion acknowledges that knowledge entrepreneurs typically strive to 
grasp opportunities from sources beyond the local to stay competitive. The fact that 
regions in India, such as Bangalore, Bombay and Chennei recently have evolved into 
dynamic and competitive high-tech districts make it plausible for Boston based Indian 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of transnational ties to their country of origin. Therefore, 
I pose the second subquestion which is formulated in two parts:   
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b) Have Indian entrepreneurs developed complementory transnational ties to actors in 
India’s high-tech regions? If yes, can these transnational ties compensate for anticipated 
exclusionary pressures in the local, established Boston high-tech network?      
 
The third subquestion takes into account the fact that technology intensive industries tend 
to produce a certain organizational structure. Since Boston’s high tech sector recently has 
experienced a technological diversification, it is of interest to investigate if diverging 
technologies advance similar organizational structures. If dissimilar technologies produce 
slightly different organizational structures, the Indian entrepreneurs may adapt their type 
of social ties to the technological specilization of their firm. For this purpose, I have 
included interviewees from different technologies in this study. Accordingly, I ask:    
 
c) Have Indian entrepreneurs in this case study adapted their set of connections to the 
type of technology at use in their firm? 
 
The research questions will not only function as a tool for exploring the type and nature 
of the social ties at use, but will also, and more importantly, assist me in determining the 
kind of tie-strategies the Indian entrepreneurs in Boston’s high-tech sector pursue. 
Significantly, the four questions will enable me to ascertain whether the social tie-
strategies that the knowledge intensive entrepreneurs in this study employ differ from the 
social tie-strategies that traditional ethnic entrepreneurs have made use of. In order to 
achieve these exploratory goals, I have deliberately chosen the research design of a 
multiple case study. My inquiry methods include the analysis of public documents, 
questionnaires, in-depth interviews and complete observation. 
 
Contribution to the Literature 
I have grounded my inquires in a rich theoretical framework to demonstrate this study’s 
relevance to the ethnic entrepreneur literature. By cementing my theoretical point of 
departure, I acknowledged significant gaps in the ethnic entrepreneur literature. 
Accordingly, my study strives to address three severe deficiencies in the literature. First 
and as already mentioned, my primary goal is to illuminate the strategies that ethnic 
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entrepreneurs make use of in a neglected arena, namely a knowledge intensive sector. 
Secondly, I have singled out an ethnic group that lacks representation within the 
American ethnic entrepreneur literature. In this study an ethnic group is defined in 
accordance to Olzak (1992 p 25) as a group fixed by a ”social boundary based on one or 
more of the following criteria: a) characteristics presumed to be based upon shared 
genealogy, b) cultural traits, including language religion, dress, custom, or assumed 
shared history, and c) nationality or regional origin.” Although much research has been 
done on other ethnic Asian groups such as Chinese, Vietnemese, Japanese and Koreans, 
there is essentially nothing available on Indians. Several researchers (Leonard & 
Tibrewal 1993, Sheth 1995) have also pointed out the need to embrace this excluded 
ethnic group in the scholarly literature. Finally, my research setting, namely the Boston 
Metropolitan area, has not been a major hub for non-European immigration flows. In 
contrast to traditional destinations for minorities such as New York, Miami, and Los 
Angeles, Boston has only recently experienced an inflow of non-Europeans. Thus, 
scholars within the ethnic entrepreneur field have yet to explore the Boston metropolitan 
area. The actors and the setting of this study carry the potential for advancing towards a 
more complete understanding of the strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs.  
 
Social Relevance 
This thesis will not only attempt to take one step towards a less biased ethnic 
entrepreneur theory, but my study is also of immediate social relevance. The research on 
Indian entrepreneurs captures one instance of the contemporary social process where 
minorities in growing numbers are breaking out from spatially and sectorally 
marginalized arenas to compete with the mainstream in the most technologically 
sophisticated sectors of the economy (Saxenian 1999). While their ethnic predecessors in 
low-skilled sectors demonstrated little evidence of expansion, sectoral diversification, 
and use of competitive practises, the new Indian entrepreneurs are motivated by goals 
similar to the mainstream entrepreneur namely, innovation, growth and profit. Thus, the 
new Indian high-tech entrepreneurs stand out as role models not only to their own ethnic 
community but also to other minority groups in the US. Furthermore, their endeavors 
may be important for job growth and economic prosperity in the region. The National 
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Comission on Entreprenurship has stated that “the benefits to us, as Americans, of 
entrepreneurs’ risk-filled but successful efforts to see change and find opportunities in it, 
to discover innovations to exploit those opportunities, and then to build and grow 
companies upon those innovations, is enormous”  
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
I have adopted the specific structure of this thesis in order to gradually immerse the 
reader into the topic, the setting, and the actors, before embarking on the empirical 
analysis. Accordingly, the second chapter provides a brief discussion of the Asian Indian 
community in the Boston region. The purpose of this chapter is to construct a basic 
understanding of the Indian entrepreneurs by focusing on Asian Indians immigration 
history and selected structural features of their ethnic community. In the third chapter, I 
use crucial historical events as my point of departure to present a convincing picture of 
the high-tech sector’s contemporary production structure, power structure and ethnic 
composition. By highlighting specific features of the Boston high-tech sector, I strive to 
develop an introductory account of the opportunity structure that the Indian entrepreneurs 
are operating in. Together, these two chapters serve as a platform for comprehending the 
theoretical framework set fourth in chapter four.  
The theoretical framework presents an ideal type picture of the research setting 
and serves as a guide to the empirical analysis. The chapter offers an in-depth conceptual 
discussion, supplementing the introductory chapters to provide a more holistic depiction 
of the opportunity structure, the actors and their potential patterns of action. It further 
serves to ground my research questions in social theory. I commence the chapter by 
clarifying the central concepts of this study. I then move on to a theoretical discussion of 
the organizational structure of the Boston high-tech sector, focusing attention on the 
increasing significance of the network form of organization, the importance of the 
regional environment, and vital external connections. By making explicit the 
organizational structure, I strive to clarify the importance of developing connections for 
the entrepreneurs. When discussing the actors potential patterns of action, I specifically 
consider the insights from inter-organizational and social network theory. I elaborate on 
the optimum characteristics of an actor’s ties, the ideal process of developing 
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connections, and plausible barriers in the context that the actors may face when 
developing their ties.  
 Having theoretically discussed the opportunity structure and the actors in detail, I 
move on to consider the central methodological issues of this study. The methodology 
chapter explains the methods of data collection and lays out the specific strategies of 
inquiry. It further provides a discussion on the role of the researchers. Finally, I discuss 
the concerns of validity and the trustworthiness of the findings.  
 The methodology chapter precedes the empirical analysis, the culmination of the 
thesis. Having gradually introduced the reader to the topic, the setting and the actors, I 
now present the empirical findings from my case study fieldwork. Moreover, I discuss 
and elaborate on the research results by systematically linking them to my research 
questions as well as to social theory. I commence the chapter by putting fourth significant 
features of the actual entrepreneurs and their firms. Thereafter, my approach follows a 
sequential order by first discussing the initial development of connections among the 
Indian entrepreneurs. I then move on to analyze selected aspects of the entrepreneurs’ 
connections at use in the daily operations of the firms. These are the ties that are crucial 
for the competitiveness of their firms. I further consider the impact of technology on the 
entrepreneurs’ role-set. Finally, in chapter seven, I return to the objective of this study. 
Based on the analysis of the entrepreneurs’ ties, I summerize the findings and make 
explicit the type of social-tie strategies that the ethnic entrepreneurs in this case study 
have adopted in a knowledge intensive, historically unique, opportunity structure. In 
other words, I cement the connections between the research questions, the objective and 
the theoretical framework.         
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Chapter 2 
The Asian Indians 
 
This chapter will present a brief overview of the Asian Indian community in the Boston 
metropolitan area. By discussing the Indian community’s immigration history and 
selected structural features of this ethnic group, I strive to develop a basic understanding 
of the individual Indian entrepreneurs of this study. It should be clear however, that a 
characteristic of the whole population of Asian Indians may not necessarily be translated 
to the individual level. Nonetheless, a discussion of the Indian community might provide 
valuable expectations about the experiences and characteristics of the Indian actors of this 
study. Furthermore, a review of the Asian Community may serve to explain the actual 
traits of the individual entrepreneurs that will be discussed in chapter six.   
 
The Indian Community  
Traditionally, Massachusetts has not been a major destination for Asian Indians 
immigrants to the US. Only around 30,000 Asian Indians reside in the Boston area today, 
representing a minor 0.9% of the total population2. However, pan Asian groups are 
actually the fastest growing minorities in the area. In the city of Boston, the Asian 
population doubled between 1990 and 2000, and the number of Asian Indians grew by 
126.4% during the same period3. Yet the increase has not been equally dramatic in the 
metropolitan area as a whole. 
  The Asian Indians that have settled in the Boston region reside close to 
workplaces such as high-tech firms, hospitals and universities (Sheth 1995). Moreover, 
their settlement pattern in the metropolitan area is a reflection of Asian Indians’ general 
preference for suburban areas. As can be illustrated by figure one, a high percentage of 
Indians have settled around Route 128 (also called route 95), the high-technology 
highway which will be discussed in the following chapters. Furthermore, the high-tech 
agglomeration around Cambridge has attracted a substantial number of Asian Indians. 
                                                 
2 US Census Bureau 2000 
3 US Census Bureau 2000 
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This subcounty4 is the sole area in the Boston region where Indians live in relative 
isolation from the white majority5. In all other cases they follow the scattered residential 
pattern of the white middleclass. As a result, Asian Indians have not established ethnic 
enclaves such as Chinatown or Little Korea (Sheth 1995).                       
 
 
Figure 1. Percent of Asian Indians in Subcounties in the Boston metropolitan area. 
Source: US Census bureau 
 
Asian Indians do generally not identify themselves with the Indian national origin group, 
but rather with a distinct subgroup reflecting regional heritage, language, diet and religion 
(Leonard & Tibrewal 1993). The major immigrant subgroups have mainly been from 
Gujarati (60%), Punjab (30%) and Kerala (10%). Furthermore, a majority has had Hindu 
as their first language and English as their second (Sheth 1995). Although regional 
subgroups may be important for cultural reasons, Leonard and Tibrewal (1993) have 
provided evidence for the significance of pan-Indian identity in regards to economic 
                                                 
4US Census bureau utilizes the terminology subcounty to describe a statistical area representing parts of a 
county.   
5 According to my calculations based on US Census data 2000 and Bluestone & Stevenson 2000 
Data Classes 
Percent 
 
 *  0.0-0.4 
 *  0.5-1.0 
 *  1.1-1.8 
 *  2.2-3.8 
 *  3.9-6.9 
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action. In other words, when Indians do business, they deliberately cross traditional, 
linguistic and religious boundaries in order to reach out to a wider clientele.       
The immigration history of Asian Indians may serve to explain the characteristics 
of the community. It was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 that spurred 
Asian, and particularly Indian, immigration to the US. The act of 1965 abolished the 
national origin quota system, which had been the largest obstacle for non-European 
immigrants. Furthermore, the US government began to allow family reunions and 
encouraged professionals with specialized knowledge to immigrate. Lastly, the 
immigration act entailed an expansion of the world coverage numerical restriction. As a 
result, Indians trained in such fields as medicine, science and engineering were part of a 
professional stream of immigrants following the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 (Segal 2002). In fact, India has become one of the major beneficaries of the act, 
sending an average of 20,000 immigrants to the US annually (Sheth 1995). In the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the Asian immigrants to the US have typically been computer 
programmers or information scientists. Of those Indians (25 years and over) who 
immigrated between 1980 and 1984, 68% held a Bachelor degree and 28% had a 
Master’s degree. Thus, the Asian Indians are exceptionally well educated in contrast to 
the white mainstream (20% received a Bachelors degree and 7% a Master’s degree) and 
other minority groups (Sheth 1995). Furthermore, the lack of quality graduate programs 
in India have spurred Asian Indians to travel abroad to enhance their own professional 
career. In most cases, these students never return to India permanently, but find positions 
in the US and transfer their student visas to permanent resident status (Segal 2002). 
Nonetheless, they typically maintain strong ties to India through frequent trips to their 
home country (Saxenian et al 2002). Extraordinary educational levels, professional 
success and a high female labor participation rate have merited the Asian Indians with a 
median income exceeding the white majority. Accordingly, Indians are perceived as the 
’model’ minority in Massachusetts and all over the country. In Segal’s words (2002 p. 
159): 
 
”The general publics overwhelming perception of Indians is that they constitute a model 
minority, are professionally successful and, according to their own cultural notions of 
health, are well adjusted both emotionally and mentally”    
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However, being a successful minority is simultaneously admirable and threatening to 
other ethnic groups, including the white mainstream. Further intimidating, is the fact that 
Asian Indians are among the fastest growing ethnic groups in the Boston area. Bluestone 
and Stevenson (2000), for example, have revealed that close to 30% of the white 
mainstream in the greater Boston region worry about competition from Asians. This 
perception, namely that one group’s gain is another group’s loss may result in a 
motivation to discriminate against Asian Indians. Despite their fluency in English and 
exceptional educational attainments, Asian Indians are underrepresented in managerial 
and other positions of authority (Sheth 1995). Moreover, Asian Indians are paid 
significantly less than their white counterparts in similar occupations. They further 
continue to believe they have to surpass the white majority in credentials in order to 
compete for jobs. Finally, a report from The Center for Urban and Regional Development 
(2000) at the Northeastern University of Boston claims that discrimination is a crucial 
factor in explaning the low market shares of ethnic minority business in the Boston area6.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented an overview of the structural characteristics of the Asian 
Indian community in the Boston region. The specific characteristics of the community 
make it interesting to look into the traits, experiences and adjustments of the individual 
Asian Indian high-tech entrepreneurs. The brief discussion above results, for example, in 
an immediate interest to investigate the particular immigration path of the Indian 
entrepreneurs in this study. The Indian community’s immigration background has 
demonstrated that ‘period of immigration’ has consequences for both educational levels 
and socio-economic background. Moreover, it is significant to focus attention on the 
Indian entrepreneurs’ group identification. Do they conform to the general pattern of 
keeping up strong ties to their local Indian community? Have they nurtured their 
connections to fellow Indians in their native country? Additionally, it is intriguing to 
research whether the Indian entrepreneurs have encountered barriers to prosperity. Have 
they been subject to discriminatory processes due to group-competition? These individual 
                                                 
6 www.neu.edu.curp  
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traits and experiences of the Indian entrepreneurs are likely to directly shape the kind of 
connections they make use of, and indirectly, to influence the sort of social tie-strategies 
they adopt. 
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Chapter 3 
The Boston High-Tech Sector 
 
The previous chapter discussed the Indian community in the Boston metropolitan area in 
order to develop a basic understanding of the Indian entrepreneurs that are the focus of 
this study. In a similar way, the current chapter will provide an introductory description 
of the opportunity structure that the Indian entrepreneurs are operating within. This brief 
overview of the Boston high-tech sector will function as a platform for understanding the 
theoretical discussion of the opportunity structure. The point of departure for the chapter 
will be the historical conditions that have influenced the contemporary production 
structure, the power structure and the ethnic composition of this flourishing, 
entrepreneurial milieu. 
 
A Brief History       
The Boston metropolitan area, located within the boundaries of the six counties of 
Suffolk, Middlesex, Essex, Norfolk, Bristol and Plymoth (see yellow marked map in 
figure 2), has a long history of innovative activity. The Boston region pioneered 
manufacturing techniques and equipment in the textile and the machine tool industry, as 
early as the nineteenth century. Since then, institutions such as the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) has supported the innovative tradition. MIT has not only 
fostered technical research and development but it has also encouraged the 
commercialization of special techniques and products developed in its laboratories. The 
specific policy combination that MIT has adopted, namely a strong collaboration with 
industry, has made it the most critical institution for the development of the innovative 
high-tech sector in the Boston metropolitan area. (Roberts 1991).   
The scope of the innovative high-tech sector, however, has not always been as 
extensive as today. Before the World War II, the sector consisted of only a few successful 
firms like Raytheon, The Bell Telephone company and EG&G, among others. Due to the 
development of the telephone, the radio and the refrigerator within these firms, science  
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Figure 2. The Boston metropolitan area. Source: US bureau of the Census 
 
and research slowly began to gain a public recognition in the area. Because of US 
involvement in the Second World War, the importance of high-tech industries drastically 
increased. Vannevar Bush, the MIT professor and director of weapons development for 
the US government, ensured that a majority of military contracts were distributed to 
firms, research institutions, labs and universities in the Boston region. The most notable 
beneficiary was MIT, receiving $117 billion in funds, representing 1/3 of all military 
contracts awarded in the US. Local firms, such as Raytheon also grew dramatically as a 
consequence of military contracts, increasing its sales from $3 million to $173 million 
between 1940 and 1945 (Rosengrante & Lampe 1992). When World War II drew to an 
end, the Boston metropolitan area, containing the academic institutions of MIT, Harvard, 
Northeastern, Tufts and Boston University as well as a concentration of industrial labs, 
offered an intellectual and technological labor pool that was unsurpassed in the nation 
(Saxenian 1994). 
  During the post-war era, an information and technology highway was buildt 
around the city of Boston to make space for the increasing numbers of firms that wanted 
140 miles across 
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to locate in the area. Surprisingly, Route 128 became so heavily congested with firms that 
new ventures were forced to allocate along route 495 and 93 and move back into areas 
such as Kendall square. The growing number of firms were partially spurred by the 
founding of the first  public venture capital firms. The American Research and 
Development firm (ARD) was a builder and creator of new companies with innovative 
technologies. By the help of advisors from MIT and Harvard, the ARD invested in 
enterprises having a technically superior product with a potential of being 
commercialised (Etzkowitz 2002). Besides the ARD, Boston’s high-tech firms also 
benefited from the presense of private investors and bankers. The First National Bank of 
Boston and New England’s Merchants Bank began lending money to newly fledged firms 
based on their past contracts and funding. Furthermore, the Brahmin families of Boston, 
as well as members of the Eastern elite like the Rockefellers, the Whitneys and the 
Mellons, got personally involved with the high-tech businesses in the region (Roberts 
1991).                     
 The success of this era was followed by a deep nationwide recession that hit 
Boston’s high-tech sector harder than any other high-tech agglomeration in the country. 
The region’s old manufacturing base fell apart and the unemployment rate rose above the 
nationwide average to 12,3 at its peak, wiping out a large number of jobs within the high-
tech sector. Changes in federal spending which had previously benefited Boston’s high-
tech sector, was partly responsible for the economic downturn. Finally, the state of 
Massachusetts increased its capital gains tax in 1969, from 25% to 49%, making it less 
attractive for venture capital firms to make high-risk investments (Rosengrante & Lampe 
1992). When taken together, these factors resulted in a major crisis for the high-tech 
sector, making scientists and engineers, as well as entire firms, leave the Boston area to 
seek opportunities in more prosperous high-tech regions, like Silicon Valley. The Boston 
metropolis had been far too dependant on federal funding and military contracts and the 
recession made high-tech companies reconsider their strategies.   
 Even though the economic downturn had been detrimental for Boston’s high-tech 
sector, the entrepreneurial productivity in the area had not totally vanished. Over 600 
small high-tech companies, relying on their own funding were founded during the years 
of the recession (1970-1975). Furthermore, Kenneth Olsen, CEO of the Digital Eqipment 
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Company, developed the first fully compatible, networked minicomputer in this time-
period (Kenney & VonBurg 1999). In 1980, the Boston area had captured 70% of the $ 9 
billion minicomputer industry and the six biggest minicomputer firms: DEC, Data 
General, Wang, Honeywell, Prime and Nixdorf, were located in the region (Saxenian 
1994). The concentration and interaction between high-tech companies, academic 
institutions and industrial labs constantly resulted in new spin-offs based on new 
innovative ideas.  
As the 1970s drew to an end, the region was booming as the fastest growing 
sector of the computer industry. However, the success of the commmercialisation of the 
minicomputer resulted in the Boston high-tech firms missing the importance of the 
microcomputer and the workstation industries. These personal computers were smaller 
and cheaper, but had the same capacity as the minicomputer. In less then three years the 
minicomputer industry lost 40,000 jobs and the unemployment rate rose again, far over 
the national average (Rosengrant & Lampe 1992). This second downturn was worsened 
by the prosperity that had preceded it, as well as by the fact that it hit the high-tech 
sector’s very core products and services. 
While the minicomputer and military electronics industries decayed during the 
second recession, some firms within other high-tech industries, namely medical devices 
and software, continued to show signs of growth. However, these companies were both 
started, and run, from a much smaller financial base. The software industry grew 
prominent due to improvements and changes in the relation between hardware and 
software. During the 1970s boom, minicomputer firms had established a proprietary 
system, where they tried to keep customers dependant upon in-house-developed products 
by producing software that was not compatible with other manufacturer’s products. With 
the development of the personal computer, however, a trend towards open system 
architecture emerged. (Bathelt 2001). The growing importance of software has been 
crucial to the recovery of the high-tech sector in the Boston metropolitan area.  
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The Contemporary High-Tech Sector 
As a result of historical trends, the contemporary structure of the Boston high-tech sector 
appears strikingly different from its status a couple of decades ago. Large firms that were 
the force behind the minicomputer industry, is no longer characterizing the sector. In fact, 
Massachusetts software firms, which are mostly concentrated in the Boston metropolitan 
area, are particularly small. 52 % of the firms employ ten or fewer people, while 72% 
employ 25 or fewer (see also table 1). Today, these smaller software firms are the 
greatest driver of the high-tech sector (Greater Boston Chambers of Commerce 2001). 
The downsizing of firms in Boston’s high-tech sector further indicates that an 
entrepreneur is in need of less capital today, than a decade ago, when launching his firm. 
As a result, the number of software establishments in the Boston area has tripled between 
1987 and 1997. Moreover, the industry added 10,000 new jobs in 1999, and 15,000 in 
2000 (Massachusetts Software and Internet council 2001). To some extent, the software 
industry has been able to compensate for the decline in the hardware industry that used to 
be at the core of the high-tech sector in the 1980s. Former hardware producers, like DEC 
and Wang, have managed to restructure their production schemes and extend their 
activities into software production. In terms of specializations, most companies tend to 
provide a product, often combined with a service, in the following areas of application 
development: business, database and customer management; financial, banking and 
investment management; medical healthcare, scientific and engineering management; and 
internet products and services (Massachusetts Software and Internet Council 2001).  
A report from The Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy (2001) focus 
attention on the importance of software industry in Boston’s high-tech sector by refering 
to important indicators such as employment patterns, patent actvity and venture capital 
flows. As shown in table one, the Boston Metropolitan area is home to almost 9,700 
software companies. Furthermore, the industry employs over 65,200 people. However, if 
we consider absolute employment numbers on their own, they are not a sufficient 
indicator of the importance of various high-tech industries. Only in conjunction with 
location quotients are they able to reveal the relative specialization of an area in a 
particular industry. A quotient greater than one demonstrates that the area has a higher 
concentration of firms in that particular industry than the rest of the nation. The location  
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Table 1. Firms and employees in the high-tech industries in the Boston metropolitan area 
 
  Establishments Paid Employees 
Hardware 756 71715 
Electrical Equipment 892 24668 
Engineering Services 44207 73051 
Instruments 547 19127 
Software 9690 65237 
Telephone Communications 2817 11196-12695 
Transportation 135 7538 
Total 56508 253955 
 
Source: 1997 Economic Census, US Census Bureau  
 
quotients confirmed the significance of software8 for the Boston metropolitan area, 
indicating numbers as high as 4,8 for the industry. In contrast, the                               
hardware industry held location quotients just above 2.0. Furthermore, the software 
industry dominates the relative measure of patents issued in various high-tech industries. 
Since patents measure the ability to develop breakthrough technology, which is essential 
to sustaining competitiveness in the high-tech industries, they provide a good assesment 
of the relative importance of software for Boston’s high-tech sector. Finally, venture 
capital had a tendency to flow to start-ups set in the software industry.     
As shown above, the software industry has been crucial to the revitalization of 
Boston’s high-tech sector. Yet, the upturn has not simply been based on one industry, but 
rather on a technological diversification of the sector (Bathelt 2001). For example, table 
one indicates the increasing importance of high-tech services (engineering services). 
Moreover, the instrument industry survived the recessions by specializing in technologies 
such as measuring and control instruments, as well as optical, medical and surgical 
instruments. Thus, as a consequence of their independence from the minicomputer 
industry, the downturns have only had a limited impact on the productivity in the 
instrument field. Today, approximately 75% of the total supplies of all instrument firms 
                                                 
7 Numbers are underestimated due to the fact that the US Census Bureau lacks numbers of firms without 
paid employees. 
8 The center on Urban and metropolitan Policy has a slightly different definition of the software industry 
than the author of this thesis has. However, these numbers can still give us a picture of the relative 
concentration of the two industries.  
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are acquired locally (Bathelt 2001). In contrast to the instrument industry, the electronic 
components industry was heavely reliant on the mini-computer’s success. Initially 
functioning as the supplier base to the mini-computer industry, these firms have been 
forced to totally restructure their production programs. In fact, the industry as a whole has 
demonstrated the remarkable capabilities of acquiring new customers and entering 
alternative markets, resulting in an increase in employment between 1992 and 1997 
(Bathelt 2001). As a whole, the high-tech industry is finally showing signs of growth 
again, after another minor downturn in the early 2000s.      
 
Features of the Contemporary High-Tech Community 
By describing the historical and contemporary Boston high-tech sector, I not only want to 
demonstrate that the sector repeatingly has gone through radical changes, but I also hope 
to illustrate that it has the ability to successfully recover from severe economic 
downturns. More importantly, the long tradition of regionally grown high-tech industries 
in conjunction with triumphant restructuring has resulted in a tightly knit community of 
high-tech firms, universities and research institutions that simultaneously cooperate and 
compete. Apart from a few exceptions, the closely connected actors in the sector have 
entirely consisted of the white, male elite. In the 1980s, only 6,7% of the state’s labor 
force was made up of minorities. In fact, the under representation of minorities was 
extreme in knowledge intensive industries, such as the high-tech sector (Dorfman 1988). 
Accordingly, the historical economic cycles of the high-tech sector have united the white, 
elite actors closely together. Rosengrant and Lampe (1992), for example, describe the 
connections between the academic and industrial research communities as well as 
between CEOs from various high-tech firms as an ”old-boy network”. From a general 
understanding of the literature, I interpret this network to consist of New England 
conservatives and their white family friends, educational peers and colleagues (Lampe 
1988, Saxenian 1994, Lampe & Rosengrant 1992, Leonard-Barton 1984 & Nohria 1992). 
Thus, the tightly knit high-tech community of white elites, as well as the puritan 
industrial tradition of Boston where identity is based on family and class background, has 
made it severely difficult for minorities to establish their firms in the area. In contrast to 
Silicon Valley, where various minority groups, such as Chinese, Indians, Israelis and 
 26
Europeans have helped to keep the area at the forefront of technology (Saxenian 1998, 
1999 & 2002), the Boston high-tech sector has stayed persistently homogenous. 
Moreover, taking into consideration the large number of Asians with engineering 
degrees, it is surprising that entrepreneurs in the Boston software industry share the 
typical set of characteristics: white and male (Donald et al 1998). In fact, minorities are 
the owners of only 4% of the software companies in the entire state of Massachusetts9. 
Nonetheless, attempts are continually being made to speed up the process of changing 
attitudes towards minority entrepreneurship and minority career development in general. 
The cooperation between The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and The 
Partnership to ”promote the placement, retention, and career development of minority 
professionals…. and promoting diversity in every aspect of its work, and throughout the 
business, government, and civic life of greater Boston” can serve as an illustration of 
these attempts (The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce 2001 p. 26). Hence, in the 
past years the sector has experienced a growing number of Black and Asian minorities 
becoming technological entrepreneurs (Roberts 1991, Tang 1995).  
As illustrated in figure three, Asian entrepreneurs make up an estimated 3.5% of 
the total numbers10 of high-tech entrepreneurs in the Boston Metropolitan area. In a 
similar way, Black-Americans represented an estimated 2%. The overrepresentation of 
the white majority (93%) is a striking feature of the ethnic composition of the Boston 
high-tech sector. This study’s focus on Asian Indians results in an immediate concern to 
make explicit the percentage of Indian entrepreneurs in the Boston high-tech sector. As 
elucidated by the inset in figure three, the estimated 3.5% of Asian entrepreneurs are 
predominantly distributed between Chinese, Asian Indians, Japanese and Koreans. Asian 
Indians are the second largest group of Asian entrepreneurs in the high-tech sector, 
making up a total of 22%. Furthermore, the Chinese represent around 45%, the Japanese 
16% and the Koreans a miniscule 5% of the total Asians. Finally, other Asian groups, too 
small to be accounted for individually, together make up around 12% of Asian 
entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
9 Massachusetts Software and Internet Industry Analysis 2002 
10 Due to the nature of the US Census bureau’s variables in the PUMS 2000, Hispanics are not included in 
the total numbers of entrepreneurs. However, since hispanics have little impact on the high-tech industries, 
this fact does not significantly alter the shares of high-tech entrepreneurs.   
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Figure 3. The ethnic composition of the Boston high-tech Sector. Source US Census 
Bureau 200011 
 
In contrast to the trend among ethnic entrepreneurs, Asian Indians have not developed an 
ethnic high-tech niche where they have clustered. An ethnic niche is a concentration of an 
ethnic group in a particular industry, relative to the concentration of the total population 
of entrepreneurs in the same industry (Razin & Light 1998). Nevertheless, they have 
demonstrated a preference for software and engineering services. This concentration also 
resembles the patterns of the white majority’s specialization. Figure four illustrates that 
an estimated 28% of all Asian Indian entrepreneurs are operating within the software 
industries, compared to 23% of their white counterparts. Furthermore, the concentration 
of 59% Asian Indians in engineering services is roughly proportional to the clustering of 
Whites (69%) in the same industry. In contrast to the white majority, however, the Asian 
                                                 
11 See appendix 3 and 4 for a discussion of methodology and the results of the tabulations of the data. Note 
that I have used ’self-employed’ as an approximation for entrepreneurs. This leads to a significant 
undercount of entrepreneurs due to the fact that so many firms are funded by outside funds or venture 
capital and thereby not owned by the founding entrepreneur. 
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Indians are completely absent in the following three high-tech fields: instruments, 
transportation and computers/hardware.     
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Figure 4. Industry concentration of white and Asian Indian entrepreneurs. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has served as an introduction to the high-tech sector and will facilitate the 
understanding of the following theoretical discussion. By illuminating selected events in 
the history of the Boston high-tech sector, I have sought to explain the characteristics of 
the contemporary opportunity structure. I have demonstrated that the sector experienced a 
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technological diversification and a shift to software as its’ core industry during the last 
decade. Moreover, the downsizing of firms have moderated the start-up requirements for 
prospective entrepreneurs. Significantly, I have discussed the ambiguity that particularly 
distinguishes the Boston high-tech sector. One the one hand, the Boston high-tech 
community has demonstrated a remarkable flexibility and capability to adapt to 
fluctuations in the global market. On the other hand, the community has embraced its 
puritan industrial tradition and remains hesitant to accept both ethnic and social diversity. 
I have suggested that the high-tech sectors very ability to collectively adjust to historical 
downturns may partially explain the peristensy of its social conservatism. More 
importantly, it is in this tightly knit sector, dominated by white, elitist, regionally 
anchored high-tech actors that the new Asians Indian entrepreneurs have launched their 
firms. The existing power relations and the ethnic composition of the Boston high-tech 
sector may theoretically be perceived as a structural facet, namely, a patterning of social 
phenomena (Peet 1998). The role of structure is typically one of confronting a certain 
individual with a characteristic set of impediments (Ibarra 1993). In this study, the extent 
to which minorities, and especially Indians, are present in the high-tech sector is a 
structural characteristic of the societal situation that may hinder the Indian entrepreneurs 
from relying on co-ethnic connections. Moreover, the sector’s domination by the white, 
male, elite may prevent the Indian entrepreneurs from naturally integrating into the local 
high-tech community. In other words, and as will be elaborated on in my theoretical 
chapter, these structural factors, may have implications for what kind of business and 
professional contacts Indian entrepreneurs are able to develop.   
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Chapter 4  
Theoretical Framework 
 
While the previous chapters have provided a background to the Indian entrepreneurs and 
the Boston high-tech sector, this chapter will discuss the theoretical framework directing 
this thesis. It will further present an in-depth theoretical elaboration on crucial 
relationships and processes underpinning this study. My aim is to offer an ideal type 
picture of the context, the actors, different aspects of the actors’ relations and their 
plausible patterns of action. The ideal type picture will serve as a platform for 
understanding why I have chosen the specific research questions, laid out in chapter one. 
In other words, I will ground my research questions in social theory. However, I will set 
out by clarifying central concepts of this thesis, namely the entrepreneur and the ethnic 
entrepreneur. I will then move on to discuss, theoretically, the organizational structure of 
the high-tech sector highlighting factors such as the increasing significance of the 
network form of organization, the importance of the regional environment, and the 
necessity of external connections. These factors will shed light on why connections have 
become vital for the individual entrepreneur. Furthermore, I will theoretically elaborate 
on the entrepreneurs’ type of connections and the prospective characteristics of these 
immediate ties. Finally, the ideal process of developing connections, and the general and 
unique barriers that Indian entrepreneurs may face will be discussed. 
 
The Entrepreneur Concept 
Joseph Schumpeter (1934) was among the first scholars to theorize about the 
entrepreneur concept. He saw the entrepreneur as an innovator, or someone who tries to 
do things in a new and unexplored manner. In his book, The Theory of Economic 
Development (1934 p. 75), he argues that ”it is the carrying out of new combinations that 
constitutes the entrepreneur”. He further emphasized the important difference between 
’entrepreneurs’ and ’capitalists’. While the entrepreneur brings about new combinations 
in the means of production, the capitalist bears the financial risk. According to 
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Schumpeter (1934 p. 66), the entrepreneur may revolutionize the patterns of production 
through five different ways: 
 
1) The development of a new product  
2) The discovery of a new production method 
3) The discovery and exploitation of a new market 
4) The discovery and exploitation of a new source of supply or raw materials 
5) The introduction of a new organization in a new industry 
 
By using terminology such as revolutionalize, discover and exploit, I seek to stress the 
great importance Schumpeter attached to radical innovation when developing the 
entrepreneur concept. Schumpeter proposed that an entrepreneur is someone who 
drastically transforms the existing supply and demand patterns (Schumpeter 1934 & 
Singh 2000). While Schumpeter focused on the importance of innovation, he also called 
attention to the significance of long-term extensive economic growth for an 
entrepreneur’s endeavors. This point has been intepreted as an indication that 
Schumpeter’s concept is anchored in the private sector of the free market economy (Kent 
et al 1982). Finally, Schumpeter recognized that entrepreneurs remain entrepreneurs as 
their role changes from setting up a new venture to acting as the owner-manager of the 
firm. This is due to the necessity of further innovations and adaptions.       
 Harwood (quoted in Kent et al 1982) has argued that a Schumpeterian definition 
of the entrepreneur, anchored in the free market economy, is too restricted for the 
emergence of prospective research in underdeveloped and centrally planned economies. 
He further claims that any definition of the entrepreneur must simultaneously consider 
the popular usage of the concept and hold on to its historical innovative roots. The 
concept ’entrepreneurial event’ encompasses any role associated with initiative, risk-
taking, resource aggregation and autonomy, and is introduced as an attempt to solve this 
problem. However, this liberal definition has a tendency to include everything from street 
performers to high-tech innovators, and may thus make explanations severely unwieldy.  
 Another alternative to Schumpeterian’s innovator has been the entrepreneur as a 
risk taker. This particular perspective derives from Richard Cantillon and was developed 
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a century before Schumpeter’s well acknowledged definition. Cantillon argued that the 
uncertainty the entrepreneur primarily has to cope with is the risk of purchasing goods at 
a certain price and selling at an uncertain price. Hence, to Cantillon, the entrepreneur 
very much resembles a traditional merchant. While Cantillon’s original definition of the 
entrepreneur was far too broad, later improvements have made this approach more 
workable. Knight (1921) for example, has suggested that the entrepreneur concept 
involves calculating and taking the risk, as well as being responsible for the resulting 
outcomes. The literature on ethnic business has specifically focused on the dimensions of 
risk when defining the entrepreneur (See for example Harisson 1995, Aldrich & 
Waldinger 1990, Light & Gold 2000). Rather than breaking new ground in the production 
processes, most entrepreneur’s solely take the risk of replicating and setting up a new 
firm. To Aldrich and Waldinger (1990), the Korean immigrant who starts up the third 
beauty salon down the street is still an entrepreneur.       
 The understanding of the entrepreneur as a resource allocater is closely related to 
Aldrich and Waldinger’s definition. The launching of a firm does not only involve direct 
risk taking but also requires the assembling and co-ordination of resources. Casson 
(1990) has argued that the factor that set the entrepreneur apart is the ability to make 
intelligent decisions about the best allocation, use, and co-ordination of scarce resources. 
In contrast to Schumpeter, Casson does not distinguish between the capitalist and the 
entrepreneur, but claims that the entrepreneur must both control and coordinate 
resources.  
Without innovativeness or novelty as part of the definition of entrepreneurship, 
the boundary between the manager and the entrepreneur is blurred. Yet, the requirement 
of radical innovation that Schumpeter calls for excludes individuals taking advantage of 
incremental innovation. According to Schumpeter’s definition, Steve Jobs, the innovator 
of the first personal computer would be considered an entrepreneur, but not those 
hundreds of individuals who profit from significant improvements of the computer. In 
contrast, I argue that even those individuals altering a product or a process should be 
entitled entrepreneurs. Thus, in accordance with Vesper (1996), I integrate both the 
incremental and radical aspects of innovation in the entrepreneur concept. Accordingly, 
an entrepreneur is simply someone who, in an innovative manner, transfers value from a 
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technological realm to an economic sphere. In other words, any individual who launches 
a new venture, based on minimal or revolutionizing innovation, is considered an 
entrepreneur.  Naturally, this definition of the entrepreneur also includes aspects of risk 
taking and the assembling and co-ordination of resources. 
 
The Ethnic Entrepreneur 
The Indian entrepreneurs that are the focus of this study, are not only innovative 
individuals who share the experience of launching a firm. They also belong to a subgroup 
of ethnic entrepreneurs that slightly diverge from the mainstream. What specifically 
distinguishes this subgroup is their common status as ’outsiders’, resulting from an 
immigration or minority background. The literature on ethnic entrepreneurs has indicated 
that ’outsider’ groups pool resources within the community in order to acquire the same 
benefits that the mainstream enjoy (Waldinger et al 1990, Waldinger 1995, Razin & 
Light 1998, Light & Gold 2000). Thus, ethnic entrepreneurs typically use some kind of 
resources deriving from their co-ethnic community. Furthermore, the reliance on 
community resources vary from group to group depending on how recent they 
immigrated or the severeness of the discriminatory pressures they encounter. In other 
cases, ethnic entrepreneurs simply draw on community resources in order to maximize 
rewards (Light & Gold 2000). Waldinger et al. (1990 p. 52) has suggested the following 
defintion of an ethnic firm:  
 
”A business whose appropriator has a distinctive group attachment by virtue of self-
definition or ascription by others”  
 
This study will be based on a slightly specified version of Waldinger’s definition, namely 
by focusing on the ethnic group attachment instead of ’distinctive group attachment’.  
Most studies on ethnic entrepreneurship have followed the sectoral concentration 
of ethnic firms and have thereby focused on low-skilled enterprises in manufacturing 
service or retail industries. Razin and Light (1998), for example, have noted that ethnic 
entrepreneurs in metropolitan areas in the US tend to concentrate in certain 
entrepreneurial niches where they compete by taking advantage of co-ethnic resources. 
Other studies demonstrate that ethnic businesses often arise where there is a demand for 
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ethnic goods that the mainstream cannot provide (Halter 1995, Aldrich & Waldinger 
1990). The extreme example has been the ethnic enclave, where immigrants or minority 
groups concentrate spatially and build up a seperate labor market in order to avoid the 
penalties of the mainstream secondary market (Portes & Manning 1986). 
 This particular study on Indian entrepreneurs represents a rather different situation 
where ethnic entrepreneurs have made a break out from spatially and ethnically 
constricted low-order markets, such as the ethnic enclave. Entry into the mainstream 
high-tech sector not only necessitates professional skills, but also financial capital far 
exceeding the assets required to set up a beauty salon or a retail firm. Therefore, I expect 
the Indian high-tech entrepreneurs to share much with their fellow white high-tech 
entrepreneurs. Yet, and as we shall see later in this chapter, ethnic entrepreneurs may 
encounter unique problems and obstacles.   
 
Organizational Structure 
When discussing the organization of the Boston high-tech sector it is crucial to note that 
economic actions (as well as other types of actions) are embedded in structures of social 
relations (Granovetter 1985). Along those same lines, certain forms of economic actions 
are specifically social (Granovetter 1985 and Powell 1990). and require both a broader 
and deeper set of ties due to the uncertainties and complexities of the exchanges. I assert 
that this ’extra social’ network form of organization stretches beyond markets and 
hierarchies, constituting an extraordinary form of coordinating economic activity (Powell 
1990). While markets offer short, simple and flexible communication, networks are able 
to transfer complex technological information and know-how based on a deeper trust and 
reciprocity. In a similar way, networks are not as unwieldy, and resistant to change as the 
hierarchical structure are (Powell & Smith-Doerr 1994).  
The hierarchical structure was ideal for the system of mass production, requiring 
large numbers of goods and services of a given quality (Saxenian 1991, Powell 1990). 
Hierarchical organization not only meant that firms developed and produced all their 
critical components internally, but also entailed a particular firm structure based on clear 
lines of authority, and limited cooperation between departments. This mode of 
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coordination was considered the most efficient under stable external conditions, as well 
as in situations that required a high level of secrecy, such as defense related production.  
As a result of global forces, however, competition has increased and entrepreneurs 
and their firms now have to bring products to markets faster than ever before. This 
shortening of product life cycles in conjunction with rapid changing technology, and 
diversified markets, make it impossible, even for the biggest firms, to autonomously stay 
at the forefront of technology (Cooke & Morgan 1993, Saxenian 1991, Freeman 1991, 
Tödtling 1994, Powell, 1990). In addition, large hierarchical firms have proven to be too 
rigid for contemporary market fluctuations. Therefore, we have seen a downsizing pattern 
where large hierarchical corporations lay-off personell in order to improve their ability to 
respond to competitive changes. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the 
number of small spin-offs and start-ups (Sengenberger & Pyke 1992). Yet, more 
important than the shrinkage of large scale organizations has been the searching for new 
methods of collaboration among former contractors and competitors. During the past 
decade, producer and supplier relations have drastically changed and are increasingly 
becoming equal, involving joint development and production processes (Saxenian 1991). 
Suppliers are perceived as long time partners with mutual dependencies. In a similar way, 
former high-tech competitors are now cooperating, resulting in blurred firm boundaries 
and a shared interest in each other’s survival. However, not only firm-to-firm relations 
have increased in importance but institutions and organizations have also become crucial 
actors in the network, assisting in spreading information and collaborating on innovative 
activity. For example, innovative activity has turned into a collective endeavor between 
entrepreneurs and their firms, universities and research labs, as well as public institutions. 
This type of collaboration has been particularly prevalent within information technology, 
and fields strongly dependent on these industries (Powell & Smith-Doerr 1994). The 
characteristic of innovative networks may further vary between being relatively informal, 
decomposable and recombinable, to strong systems of relations lasting many decades. 
Debresson and Amesse (1991) suggest that no high-tech firm can survive today, without 
being part of an innovation network. Moreover, innovative high-tech firms need a range 
of ”information ties” to research institutions, universities, and other firms in order to 
recruit competent employers, keep abreast of ’best practice’ and organizational policies. 
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The uncertainty of the high-tech sector rising costs of product development and 
the tendency for complex know-how to be embedded in human beings make network 
forms of organization more advantageous than both markets and hierarchies. According 
to Powell (1990 p. 303) networks are ”lighter on their feet” and may distribute the high 
risk of new product development among a multitude of actors. In a similar way, the ties 
in the network are typically durable relations to specific actors, and therefore allow a 
better knowledge of the capabilities and reliabilities of partners, as well as the quality of 
the exchanged recourses. Furthermore, being part of a network may equip actors with a 
common understanding of technological problems and result in mutual learning and 
super-additive gains (Debresson & Amesse 1991). Thus, entrepreneurs in a high-tech 
sector do benefit from the network mode of organization. 
 In the Boston high-tech sector, this ”extra social” network form of organization, 
described here, has emerged as a response to the merciless recessions discussed in 
chapter three. A quotation from Best (2000 p. 461) can further illustrate this point. 
 
”What is remarkable about route 128 has been the pace and extent of organizational 
change from the old, closed system to a new, open-system model of technology 
management and business organization. The speed of change and vitality of the 
resurgence can be explained in terms of development and diffusion of the new principle 
of  systems integration within a unique ’virtuous circle of regional dynamics’.”  
 
In Best’s statement on the ‘virtuous circle of regional dynamics’ he also emphasizes the 
increasing significance of the regional environment. Due to the following factors, 
relationships between actors benefit considerable from geographical proximity:  
1) The transfer of complex technological information and know-how is 
facilitated by a common understanding and face-to-face contact 
2) The need to cooperate with and follow up suppliers and customers 
3) Trust is developed by repeated interactions and a common cultural 
background and thereby reduces uncertainties 
4) Advice, support, and information can be drawn from regional institutions, and 
universities, responding to a ’regional mission’ (Tödtling 1994) 
The scholarly literature also focus attention on the fact that regional ties seems to be of 
greater importance in certain stages of the firm, such as the early growth period (Nohria 
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1992, Larson & Starr 1993, Tödtling 1994). Of particular value is the intensity of 
relations to venture capital firms, universities, research institutions, suppliers and 
customers. Yet, geographical proximity is critical for firms in all stages, dealing with 
practical, production related issues and innovation. Morgan and Cooke (1993) mention 
for example software designing as an industry that requires a high degree of face-to-face 
ties. However, in the case of the Boston’s high-tech sector, Best (2000 p. 465) has argued 
that innovative activity is more dependant on regional actors than any other production 
related activity:   
 
”Route 128 have developed regional innovation capabilities embedded in virtual 
laboratories in the form of broad and deep networks of operational, technological, and 
scientific researchers which cut across companies and universities.”                           
 
Yet, the regional environment is not only of practical relevance, providing the 
entrepreneur and the firm with supplier and customer ties, innovation collaborations, and 
practical know-how embodied in local employees. It also has a bonding function. 
Network forms of organization will best flourish in an environment where agents share 
some kind of common background (Powell 1990). Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) 
suggest that the more homogenous a group is, the easier it is to develop ties of mutual 
trust. As discussed in chapter three, the local entrepreneurs in the Boston high-tech sector 
have mainly been white, males from higher social classes. Even though the composition 
of the sector is starting to change, resulting in a growing number of minority 
entrepreneurs, the setting largely remains ethnically and culturally homogeneous. 
Moreover, the sector does not only have a long tradition of innovative activity but is also 
centered around crucial educational institutions, such as MIT, Harvard, Northeastern, 
Boston, and Tufts Universities. Finally, many entrepreneurs share similar professional 
experiences by starting their careers in a research environment, followed by consulting 
activity, before launching their own firms (Corman et al 1988). Thus, the development of 
the network form of organization in the Boston high-tech sector has been eased by a 
shared ethnic, cultural and geographical affiliation. In fact, Bathelt (2001 p. 309) 
demonstrates that even in diverse high-tech industries, entrepreneurs share the same local 
identities upon which relations of trust can be built:     
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”It is clear, however, that even technologically unrelated industries share the same 
regional lifestyle and socio-cultural characteristics, as well as organization principles 
and manufacturing traditions.”  
 
Accordingly, I see a striking resemblance between the sector’s organizational 
features and an industrial district. I understand that the original development of the 
industrial district concept, drawn from case studies in ’third Italy’, might diverge from 
the specific case of the Boston high-tech sector. In contrast to the historical development 
of close ties in ‘third Italy’, the Boston high-tech sector has only recently developed this 
”extra social” organizational structure as a response to increasing competition. 
Furthermore, the Boston high-tech network is not as tightly knit as ’third Italy’. Yet, due 
to the development and expansion of the industrial district concept, incorporating 
different ‘types’ of industrial formations in various countries such as Germany, 
Switzerland, Japan, Sweden and the USA (Nakano 2002, Glasmeier 1991, Johannisson 
1994, Grabher 1993, Saxenian 1994), I claim that it’s plausible to compare the 
contemporary structure of the Boston high-tech sector with an industrial district. 
Furthermore, Sengenberger and Pyke (1992) discuss organizational form, entrepreneurial 
dynamism, a skilfull and adaptable workforce, and geographically bounded trust, as key 
characteristics of an industrial district. As illustrated above, as well as in chapter three, 
these features are all present in the Boston high-tech sector. 
 Portraying the contemporary Boston high-tech sector as a connected industrial 
district with high levels of local supplier, information, and innovation linkages provides a 
starting point for my analysis. Yet failing to consider the embedded external relations 
extending beyond the region’s boundary, will result in an imprecise depiction of the high-
tech sector. Following Markusen, (1996 p. 309) I claim that industrial districts ”cannot be 
studied by focusing only on local institutions and behaviors, because their companies 
(through corporate relationships, trade associations, trade, government contracts) workers 
(via migration and international unions) and other institutions (universities, government 
institutions) are embedded in external relationships – both cooperative and competitive – 
that condition their commitment to the locality and their success their”. Thus, even when 
economic activity seems to be spatially clustered, a more thorough investigation of the 
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industrial district may reveal that the actors rely on numerous sites, institutions and 
connections which do not just stretch beyond the district but partially constitutes it. 
Moreover, knowledge intensive entrepreneurs are among the most widely connected and 
mobile people, constantly on the move and dependant on distanciated relations sustained 
by the new digital and fiber-optic technologies (Amin & Thrift 2002). Significantly, 
Saxenian (1998, 1999) has demonstrated that immigrant high-tech entrepreneurs are 
particularly reliant on external connections. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the 
high-tech entrepreneur is entirely caught in the ‘tyranny’ of proximity, when searching 
for business opportunities.   
External connections are further crucial to the continuing success of an industrial 
district. A homogeneous region totally dominated by regional connections may result in 
processes such as ’groupthink’ that precludes competing perceptions and interpretations 
of information (Grabher 1993). Close ties between local industry, universities, research 
institutions and firms may further be distorted into collaboration against economic 
innovation. Without complimentary external connections the regional ties may be turned 
from ”ties that bind to ties that blind”, in Grabher’s words (1993 p. 24). An industrial 
districts will benefit from inputs from both national and transnational ties that enable 
improvements and innovations other than those along the districts technological 
trajectory. Thus, while too little regional embeddeness may prevent cooperation on 
innovation, crucial to contemporary high-tech industries, too much local embeddedness 
may prevent newer radical innovations (Grabher 1993). As a result, the scarce resource in 
a knowledge intensive industrial district lies not only in the ability to develop strong 
regional ties but also in the competence of establishing complex business and 
professional relations across cultural and linguistic boundaries (Saxenian 1999).  
 The network form of organization, based on a densely knit regional network 
complemented by external connections has been particularly prevalent in technology 
intensive industries (Powell 1990). This development is not surprising considering, as 
already mentioned, how global competition has resulted in rapid changing technology 
and volatile markets. The uncertainties of the industries draw firms to collaborate to 
reduce risks and overcome weaknesses. If technology intensive industries tend to produce 
a certain organizational structure, it is of interest to look into whether different 
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technologies initiate equivalent organizational structures. This is particularly intriguing to 
investigate in the case of the Boston high-tech sector, which recently has experienced a 
technological diversification. If technologies such as electrical equipments, architecture, 
engineering, telephone communications, hardware and IT/software bring about slightly 
diverging organizational structures, actors may choose to adopt their connections to the 
unique organizational structure of their technological specialization. Accordingly, a 
question regarding the impact of technology arises from the discussion on the 
organizational structure.        
 
The Entrepreneur’s Ties 
While earlier studies have tried to map the entire network of a closed set of actors 
(Johannisson 1994, Nakano 2002), my ambitions are rather to focus on the ties of a few 
individual entrepreneurs. In this section, I borrow concepts from inter-organizational 
network theory and social network theory to integrate the different business, institutional 
and social aspects of the entrepreneurs’ immediate ties.      
Inter-organizational network theory, employed to describe the organizational 
structure of Boston’s high-tech sector, has typically been used to explain the interactions 
between firms in industrial districts (Powell 1990, Pyke & Sengenberger 1990, Saxenian 
1991 & 1994 O’Donell et al 2001). In these districts, ties occur because firms perceive 
other firms to simultaneously embrace the roles of competitors and allies. In third Italy, 
Brusco (quoted in Brown & Butler 1993) found that firms cooperated with some firms at 
specific stages, while competing fiercely in other stages. Aldrich and Dubini (1991) 
argues that the inter-organizational network increases in importance, once the firm has 
become established and familiar with different actors in the immediate and external 
context. In this study, I want to treat the inter-organizational ties and the inter-personal 
ties of the individual entrepreneur as one. The inter-personal ties consist of people with 
whom the entrepreneur has direct relations to, but are not specifically other entreprenurs, 
institutions or regional organizations. They may consist of family friends, former 
colleagues, and university mates or in other words, what the literature has called ’the old-
boy’ network (Leonard & Barton 1983, Rosengrant & Lampe 1992) According to 
Leonard and Barton (1983) these ties have long been used for business purposes in the 
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US. Inter-personal contacts are typically ties that the entrepreneur met on a face-to-face 
basis and provides support, advice and information to the entrepreneur (Johannisson 
1994, Aldrich & Dubini 1991) These type of ties are primarily perceived to be crucial in 
the early phases of the firm, but may also serve as a continual support and source of 
information about improving operational efficiency and identifying new business 
opportunities (Brown & Butler 1993). In accordance with Johannisson (1994), I argue 
that inter-organizational and inter-personal ties do not need to be separated, when firms 
involved are generally small. Accordingly, the entrepreneur is capable of integrating the 
various social, business and institutional dimensions of the ties. 
The literature reveals that different aspects of the ties are positively related to the 
performance of the entrepreneur’s firm (Burt 1992, Aldrich and Zimmer 1986, Larson 
and Starr 1993). Furthermore, the scope of resources available to the entrepreneur 
through his contacts, are also dependent upon the kind of people with who the 
entrepreneur interacts. Therefore, I will discuss the optimum nature and characteristics of 
the entrepreneurs’ different relations. More specifically, I will solely focus on ties that ”in 
some way contribute something to the entrepreneur and his firm, either passively, 
reactively or proactively” (Gilmore & Carson 1999 p. 31). 
The first aspect of a tie concerns what flows through it, or what I call content. 
Earlier studies have used various kinds of conceptions to categorize the content of a 
relationship. For example, Johhanisson (1994) operates with the terms friendship-, 
commercial- and professional ties while Bryson et al. (1993) uses the classifications 
supply, demand and support connections. However, none of these categories are ideal for 
the focus of this study. In a high-tech context, I would instead suggest the following types 
of content: information, innovation, physical or materialistic resources and support. 
Information is of great importance for the high-tech entrepreneur and may entail news 
about markets, employees and technology. These kinds of ties may involve an array of 
actors, varying from family and personal friends to other entrepreneurs, universities and 
regional organizations. Innovation flows is another broad category of contacts, referring 
to all the ties that somehow contribute to the innovative processes of the firm. In an era 
when innovation has become a collaborative endeavor, innovative ties may include 
universities, labs, research institutions as well as other entrepreneurs and firms. On the 
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other hand, relations that transfer materialistic resources are generally more limited. They 
refer to links that supply the entrepreneur with important components as well as ties to 
actors that contribute financially to the entrepreneurs firm. Support ties may typically 
involve close friends, family and former colleagues that may offer advice and 
encouragement. A fifth and ideal category, is when two or more of the mentioned 
contents, simultaneously flow through the tie. I will call this a multiplex tie. In industrial 
districts with a relatively dense network, such as the Boston high-tech sector, multiplex 
ties are especially common (Johannisson 1994). One might for example find overlaps of 
innovation and support flows. Since the strength of a relationship is partly dependant on 
its multiplexity it may be of particular importance for the high-tech entrepreneur to be in 
possession of such ties.   
 The second aspect of a tie concerns the strength of the relation. The literature has 
additionally used the terms ’intensity’, and ’quality of a relationship’ to describe tie-
strength (Hall et al 1977, Zhao & Aram 1995). Tie-strength may not only be a function of 
the frequency of exchanges, but also a measure of the amount of resources that flows 
through it. According to Aldrich (1989), the benefits of a strong tie based on trust and 
reciprocity will far outweigh a weaker one, when the information or resources exchanged 
are manifold and complex. Furthermore, strong ties have greater motivation to be of 
assistance and are typically more easily available. Uzzi (1996) found that firms with 
strong ties to other actors in a set environment had better chances of survival than those 
with weak or lacking relations. However, this was only true to a certain threshold. After 
having passed the threshold, negative effects on the competitiveness of the firm, were 
associated with tie strength. A plausible explanation might be the exhaustive cost of 
maintaining extensive, deep ties. Moreover, a lack of weak relations may seal the 
entrepreneur off from novel and external information. From a knowledge entrepreneur’s 
point of view, supplementing, weak connections may be critical to function effectively in 
a globalized world. Apart from nuancing the argument of strong ties, Uzzi’s study also 
revealed that strong relations, in contrast to weak, have three significant features. The 
first feature entails the amount of trust liable to strong ties. Uzzi’s interviewees not only 
described their strong ties as being part of the company, but also claimed that they had an 
interest in what their partners where doing, even outside of business. An actor in a strong 
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tie was convinced that the partner would not take advantage of him. The second feature 
involved the transfer of fine-grained information. Uzzi’s interviewees would pass on 
critical information relating to new business opportunities to their strong ties and thus 
give them an advantage in relation to their competitors. The final feature of a strong 
relationship is joint problem solving. Uzzi’s informants worked through problems with 
their strong partners instead of exiting, and thereby enriched their strong contacts with 
new solutions to the ‘bottlenecks’ they encountered.  
In an industrial district, the paramount organizational feature is the existence of 
strong connections between firms (Sengenberger & Pyke 1992). With strong ties, an 
entrepreneur will not stand alone but rather depend on the whole network of firms to 
acquire resources. Strong ties will further protect the entrepreneur from the volatily that 
specifically characterizes high-tech industries. However, as mentioned in a previous 
section, firms in an industrial district do not only cooperate but do also compete. 
Accordingly, it is the combination of strong and weaker linkages between actors that 
keep the industrial community intact. These are factors knowledge intensive 
entrepreneurs from industrial districts have to take into concideration when developping 
connections.   
     The third aspect of a tie concerns its durability and is a measure of the time a 
relation has lasted. Empirical findings have demonstrated that entrepreneurs tend to hold 
on to the their ties as they age (Aldrich & Staber 1995). The high-tech entrepreneur 
profits from longlasting ties in the sence that trust and reciprocity tend to grow with time. 
In other words, durability is indirectly related to tie strength.   
Centrality is a forth significant feature of ties and refers to whom or to which 
organisations entrepreneurs develop their ties to (Debresson & Amesse 1991). As a result 
of the asymetries of most networks, specific actors benefit more than others do from their 
relationships. A central actor in a network is an individual or organization ”who is tied to 
many others in the system, and the extent to which these others are in turn tied to many 
others themselves” (Powell & Smith-Doerr 1994 p. 378). Such an actor will posess an 
optimal position in regards to obtaining information on i.e. new technologies, prospective 
employees, ’best practice’ innovation, venture capital and new customers. In fact, earlier 
studies have demonstrated that it is not an entrepreneur’s total individual assets that is 
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important, but rather the resources that the actor can mobilize through his social ties 
(Powell & Smith-Doerr 1994).  
It is of particular importance to be connected to central actors in knowledge 
intensive industries where technology changes rapidly and the life cycles of products are 
relatively short. Yet, mapping all the ties in the Boston high-tech sector in order to single 
out the well-connected actors goes far beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
tightly knit community of high-tech actors in the Boston region makes it plausible to 
employ the integration into the white, elitist high-tech network as an approximation for 
centrality.   
 I have labeled the fifth significant feature of an entrepreneur’s connections: 
complementary. The vocabulary is chosen to demonstrate the perfecting role of external 
orientation in one’s immediate connections, while simultaneously cementing the role of 
locality. In other words, complementarity refers to the supplementing function of 
external, (i.e. national and transnational) ties. Complementary connections trancend an 
entrepreneur’s own narrowly circumscribed group and enables the entrepreneur to grasp 
opportunities from sources beyond the local (Grabher 1993). They further prevent the 
local entrepreneur to be locked into a homogeneous regional culture, where actors have 
ceased to challenge the underlying assumptions of the industrial district. As recently as 
the 1970s, only large firms had the opportunity to develop external capabilities. However, 
as a result of new transportation and communication technologies, any entrepreneur may 
build ties to foreign firms to tap overseas expertise, cost-savings and markets (Saxenian 
1999).  
Diversity is the last aspect of entrepreneurs’ ties and is uniquely relevant to 
informative ties. It refers to connections of the entrepreneur who are not known by each 
other (Aldrich & Dubini 1991). Since the strong ties of an entrepreneur are more likely to 
know each other, information known to one person is rapidly diffused to the others. 
Thereby, the entrepreneur will get no new information from talking to one strong contact 
beyond what she already knows from interacting with another. On the other hand, the 
entrepreneur’s weak ties are less likely to know each other and may therefore contribute 
with new information deriving from their specific ties. According to Granovetter (1973 & 
1982), individuals with few weak ties will be disadvantaged due to the lack of 
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information from diverse parts of the social system. However, it is questionable how 
significant weak and diverse ties are to high-tech entrepreneurs. In order to transfer 
sensitive and complex information in their daily operations, entrepreneurs need to resolve 
problems of trust and reliability. Weak and diverse ties are not very likely to carry such 
attributes. Yet, Uzzi’s study demonstrated that the drawback of having only strong ties is 
that it may seal the entrepreneur off from new opportunities. Thus, a high-tech 
entrepreneur may benefit from balancing weak and diverse informative ties with a set of 
stronger ties.          
 These optimum characteristics of an entrepreneurs ties makes it interesting to 
investigate what kind of ties ethnic entrepreneurs in knowledge intensive industries 
employ. Are the optimum characteristics reflected in the Indian entrepreneurs’ total set of 
connections?   
 
The Development of Connections and Prospective Barriers 
 In the initial steps of launching a new firm, the entrepreneur’s role-set, namely his 
complete set of connections are typically irrelevant and imperfect to carry out the daily 
operations of the firm. In order to develop an appropriate set of ties, and integrate into the 
overall network, the entrepreneur must engage in a time consuming search and selecting 
process (Aldrich & Dubini 1991, Larson & Starr 1991). More specifically, the need to 
acquire resources, stay abreast on new technology and find apropiate collaborative 
partners drives the entrepreneur to both take advantage of established relations and 
develop new ties to relevant actors in, and beyond, the local context. As mentioned 
above, the development of ties are facilitated if the actors share some kind of common 
background (Granovetter 1985, Powell 1990, Larson & Starr 1993 & Waldinger 1995) 
Furthermore, the entrepreneur’s past relations play a crucial role. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurs may turn to their previous colleagues, university mates, friends and family 
to assist them in developing their role-set. Uzzi (1996) found that personal relations were 
fundamental in expanding the entrepreneur’s ties, by acting as the third party referral or 
simply extending a friendship to a business relation. In the first situation, an already 
established contact would act as the go-between to a new contact and thereby transfer the 
trust from the existing relationship to the newly established one. The third party would 
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further use the reciprocity owed to him by his contact and transfer it to the newly 
matched pair of actors. In the second situation, a previous tie would be engaged in new 
collaborations, elaborating the multiplexity of the relationship. 
Larson and Starr (1993) have suggested that the process where actors expand and 
strengthen their relationships may be divided into three stages. Applying their model to 
entrepreneurs in the Boston high-tech network would imply that actors in the very first 
stage, would turn to their prior colleagues, friends and family in order to facilitate the 
expansion of their role-set. We would further expect them to draw on their regional 
affiliation, their class and their ethnicity in order to establish trust with their new ties. 
When entering the second stage, the entrepreneur would be equipped with a broad range 
of contacts consisting of the prior relations and the newly established ties. The new ties 
would still be relatively weak, due to the lack of repeated interactions, their single 
dimension and their limited durability. However, the flow of complex information, 
innovation and physical resources requires strong and multiplex ties. This dilemma would 
gradually be overcome in the second stage, when exchanges and evaluations are 
accumulated and explicit and implicit rules begin to take shape. Furthermore, the 
relations would increasingly become more complex, interweaving social and economic 
dimensions (Larson & Starr 1993). Not until the third stage, however, would the relations 
be characterized by the required trust, reciprocity, mutual goals and interdependence that 
it takes to transfer the fine-grained technological information, or embark in collaborative 
innovation. In this last stage, certain key ties would be prioritized over others, resulting in 
blurred firm boundaries and tightly integrated actors. Finally, the matured role-set would 
function as a platform for establishing new ties, equipping the entrepreneur with the 
appropriate ’tools’ for integrating into the Boston high-tech network. 
This theoretical ’thumbnail’ sketch of the development of ties and integration into 
the Boston high-tech sector is obviously a simplified and idealized account of the 
process. Moreover, it does not take into consideration the various barriers that an 
entrepreneur would encounter. As I intend to demonstrate, the barriers are in fact related 
to the same mechanisms that ease and enhance exchanges between actors in the high-tech 
sector. We recall that a shared background and prior interactions with a person, facilitate 
the development of a strong relation in economic life. Granovetter specifically points this 
 48
out in his commonly cited article on Economic Action and Social Structure (1985 p. 491), 
by stating that individuals are concerned with the ”identity and past relations of 
individual transactors”. He further notes that, to some extent, this is a ”function of 
whether they or their own contacts have had satisfactory past dealings with the other”. By 
drawing attention to the importance of identity and past interactions, Granovetter aims to 
argue that ”social relations (…) are mainly responsible for the production of trust in 
economic life” (1985 p. 491). According to Zucker (1986), identity refers to an attribute 
or a certain background that is ascribed to an individual. Trust is therefore a result of 
characteristics such as family background occupational history and ethnicity. Actors 
relying on identity primarily seek out information concerning social similarity. Socially 
similar persons generally share the same worldview and have a mutual understanding of 
how exchanges should be carried out. The more background attributes that are held in 
common, the easier and more satisfactory is the transaction (Zucker 1986). Thus, 
interpersonal similarity increases ease of communication, improves predictability of 
behavior, and fosters relationships of trust and reciprocity. As I have discussed above, 
exchanges in the Boston high-tech network are largely smoothed by interpersonal 
similarities. The actors in the sector have traditionally been rather homogeneous, not only 
sharing the same regional affiliation but also common attributes, such as class and 
ethnicity. Part of a conversation from Nohria’s (1992 p. 248) case-study on high-tech 
entrepreneurs seeking out partners to provide them with financial capital, may function as 
an illustration of the importance of identity in the Boston high-tech context; 
 
A: ”I’ve been involved in this venture for the last two years 
B: And what where you doing before that? 
A: Well, I graduated from MIT, worked with Raytheon for a while, then went on the 
GTE Labs. During that time, I was basically working on defense contracts. Then about 
five years ago, I joined a friend of mine in this instrumentation venture, but that was 
soon acquired and that’s when I decided to start my own venture. 
B: Which part of Raytheon did you work in? I used to know some folks who were also 
involved in defense contracts there”. 
              
The conversation continues and the actors cross-examine one another until they have 
discovered that they not only share the same regional affiliation but also a common social 
position upon which a relation of trust may be built. What is further interesting with this 
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conversation is that the actors establish a common link via a person they are both 
connected with. Accordingly, they have based their newly developed relation on both 
identity and past relations. Granovetter specifically emphasized that actors prefer to 
interact with members of their own role-set. It is due to the fact that ”one trusts one’s own 
information best- it is richer, more detailed, and known to be accurate” (Granovetter 1985 
p. 490). Yet, the same factors that resolve the problems of trust and reliability among 
actors may also have the effect of restricting outsiders (Waldinger 1995). If established 
high-tech entrepreneurs prefer interacting with well-known partners and passing on and 
retrieving information from their ’old-boy network’, what about newcomers who lack 
’track records’? The extreme volatility of the high-tech sector and the complexity of 
interactions will make established entrepreneurs hesitant to form ties and collaborate with 
newcomers. Furthermore, since repeated interactions are associated with trust and 
reciprocity, the opposite, namely the lack of prior relations will be linked to malfeasance. 
Hence, an entrepreneur who tries to enter the high-tech field will, on the one hand, have 
to overcome barriers associated with being a ’neophyte’ (Waldingers 1995). On the other 
hand, some of the newcomers will also be confronted with barriers stemming from the 
fact that they are not perceived to be ”members of the club” (Waldinger 1995 p. 559). 
The trust deriving from a shared worldview based on regional affiliation, class 
background and ethnicity does not apply to outsiders who possess contrasting 
characteristics. Furthermore, if transactions with insiders generate standards of behavior 
that discourages opportunism, interactions with outsiders who lack significant attributes, 
will be associated with predatory behavior. Therefore, established actors will be even 
more hesitant to develop ties to neophytes who also possess a different identity that 
further push beyond the high-tech community. 
 The Indian entrepreneurs that are the focus of this particular study may not only 
encounter barriers associated with being neophytes, but also impediments relating to the 
lack of ’correct’ individual traits. We know from the discussion in chapter two that a 
large majority of Indians are foreign born and recent immigrants. Thus, we may expect 
Indian entrepreneurs to possess characteristics that contrast with the established actors in 
the high-tech sector of the Boston metropolitan area. Chapter two further illuminated that 
the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, triggered an increased inflow of immigrants 
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from India, as well as from other Asian countries. These were, to a large extent, highly 
educated professionals with extensive working experiences. Furthermore, the Asian 
science and engineering workforce in America is comprised of a disproportionate number 
of students-turned-immigrants (Tang 1995). Thus, it is plausible that Indian entrepreneurs 
in the Boston high-tech sector are educated in the region and possess social positions 
similar to the white high-tech entrepreneurs. If this is the case, the barriers of class and 
regional affiliation will not be as grave and excluding as the ethnic boundary. For 
example, Barth  (1969 p. 17) has suggested that ethnicity is ”super ordinate” to most 
other statuses. This super ordinate character may imply that ethnicity cannot easily be 
disregarded or temporarily set aside.  
 Deriving from the set of arguments outlined above, is the notion that the different 
entry barriers are unintended consequences of the nature of economic action, or what 
Waldinger (1995) has aptly phrased ”the other side of embededdness”. The same network 
or individual role-set that makes it possible for the established entrepreneur to exchange 
complex information and immerse into collaborative innovation, also has the drawback of 
excluding newcomers, especially those lacking the ’correct’ identity. While agreeing with 
Waldinger’s argument, I would further like to assert that the unintended exclusionary 
mechanisms relating to ethnicity might be reinforced by specific social processes and 
thereby supplemented by intended exclusionary pressures. This may occur when barriers 
to ethnic group contact begin to break down (Olzak 1992), as in the case of the Boston 
high-tech sector. As demonstrated in chapter three, white males have traditionally 
dominated the Boston high-tech sector. Only recently, and in growing numbers, have 
Asian entrepreneurs entered the field (Roberts 1991, Tang 1995). Furthermore, we know 
from earlier entrepreneurship studies that immigrants and minorities in general, tend to 
concentrate in certain sectoral niches or ethnic enclaves (Light & Gold 2000, Aldrich & 
Waldinger 1990, Lee 1999).  Due to the limitation of these markets, as well as increases 
in immigrants and minorities’ educational levels, financial capital and political power, 
entrepreneurship must invariably spill over into the mainstream economy. When 
minorities enter a field that traditionally has been controlled by another ethnic group, 
such as the white mainstream, the dominant group will view the advancing group as a 
threat to their position (Olzak 1992). In other words, the entrance of Indian minorities 
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into the high-tech field may generate a motivation by the established white entrepreneurs 
to exclude Indian entrepreneurs from the high-tech network, thereby adding intended 
exclusionary mechanisms to the unintended. I thereby suggest that the unique barriers 
minority entrepreneurs might face must be regarded as a consequence of the 
embededdness of economic action, as well as a result of the well-documented (Skeeter 
1985, Bates 2001, Rapports from CURP 2001 & GBCC 2001) discriminatory process. A 
question that considers the openness of the Boston high-tech sector arise as a result of the 
unintended and the intended consequences of economic action. In a previous section, I 
demonstrated the importance of being part of a network for a high-tech entrepreneur. The 
particular power structure of the Boston high-tech sector makes it interesting to 
investigate whether the Indian entrepreneurs have managed to integrate into the 
established high-tech network of the mainstream.  
 
Ethnic Strategies? 
While white entrepreneurs face familiar terrain when entering the high-tech sector, ethnic 
minorities may be confronted with skepticism. The mechanism of network closure that 
excludes minorities from crucial resources in the field may force them to adopt certain 
tie-strategies in order to stay competitive. Comprehensive empirical evidence have 
demonstrated that the reliance on proximate co-ethnic ties has been the prevailing 
strategy to pursue (Aldrich & Waldinger 1990, Portes 1995, Waldinger 1995, Zhou, 
1998, Light & Gold 2000). However, evidence in favour of ethnic tie strategies has not 
derived from ethnic entrepreneurs in knowledge intensive industries. In contrast, studies 
have focused on low-skilled sectors where ethnic minorities have limited knowledge 
about the new context and need to obtain reliable information on permits, laws and 
business sites (Waldinger et al 1990). In such cases, minorities not only tend to turn to 
their already established co-ethnic connections to retrieve crucial information, but they 
also typically take advantage of ethnic family and friends in order to secure cheap or 
unpaid labor. Ethnic ties may provide them with information on trustworthy co-ethnic 
suppliers who are flexible on credit and may carry out transactions in their common 
native language (Aldrich & Waldinger 1990). Another frequently mentioned benefit of 
co-ethnic contacts has been the rotating credit associations (Light & Gold 2000). 
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Members of these associations agree to rotate their periodic contribution around the 
group until all has received the whole sum of money. Light and Bonacich (1988) have 
demonstrated that Korean credit associations in Los Angeles provide members with large 
sums of money, sufficient to start up a restaurant or purchase a gasoline station. A co-
ethnic role-set may also be valuable as a source of capital, beyond the rotating credit 
association. An often cited example are extensive loans between kinsmen that are sealed 
through verbal agreements and rarely involves any interest (Waldinger et al. 1990) Ethnic 
entrepreneurs further tend to devote a lot of time and effort to nurturing and developing 
their co-ethnic role-set by taking advantage of ethnic ritualized occasions and ethnic 
media (Aldrich & Waldinger 1990).  
Notwithstanding the benefit of ethnic tie strategies in low skilled sectors, it is 
questionable how rewarding a local ethnic role-set may be in a knowledge intensive 
industry like the Boston high-tech sector. For example, Light and Gold (2000 p. 104) 
have suggested that ethnic ties are ”more important in the entrepreneurship of 
impoverished groups than in the entrepreneurship of the affluent”. Moreover, Ram 
(1999), has noted that the demand for highly skilled and credentialized workers in 
professional sectors, leave little scope for recruiting through one’s co-ethnic role-set. 
Thus, the complexity of a high-tech firm makes it highly unlikely that an entrepreneur 
solely can rely on a local co-ethnic role-set to stay competitive. In the case of Boston’s 
high-tech sector, are Indian entrepreneurs able to stay abreast on new technology only 
trough interactions with other co-ethnics in the field? Can they retrieve crucial 
information such as news on ’best practice’, new market opportunities and prospective 
employees, from their ethnic organizations and institutions? Is the local ethnic role-set 
sufficient to equip an Indian entrepreneur with appropriate suppliers? Finally, the under 
representation of Indians in the high-tech sector, might make it severely difficult for 
ethnic entrepreneurs to locate other co-ethnics. Therefore, I anticipate Indian 
entrepreneurs in the Boston high-tech sector to prioritize other social ties in order to stay 
competitive. I also perceive the specific characteristics of the high-tech sector to attenuate 
the importance of local ethnic relations. In other words, I expect my study to diverge 
from earlier studies that have confirmed ethnic entrepreneurs comprehensive reliance on 
the ethnic tie-strategy. Furthermore, the optimum nature and characteristic of a role-set, 
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positively related to the performance of an entrepreneur’s firm, conflicts with a role-set 
over represented by regional co-ethnic ties. For example, insufficient diversity and a lack 
of external orientation in one’s role-set may prevent an ethnic entrepreneur who pursues 
an ethnic tie strategy from succeeding. Moreover, failing to integrate into the mainstream 
high-tech network may result in the entrepreneur missing out on crucial resources in the 
regional environment.  
A recent study by Saxenian et al (2002) sets forth evidence of an alternative tie-
strategy ethnic entrepreneurs may pursue. Saxenian demonstrates how Indian and 
Chinese entrepreneurs from Silicon valley extensively make use of their transnational 
ties to local high-tech sectors in India, China and Taiwan. This is also in accordance with 
social theory that stresses the importance of complementory external ties that assists the 
entrepreneur in grasping opportunities from sources beyond the local. Transnational ties 
further have the potential to spur innovations other than those along the districts 
technological trajectory. Immigrants typically have a deep understanding of the area they 
come from and apprehend the kind of attitude and behavioral pattern present. Moreover, 
they are at least bilingual and can move easily between the US and their country of origin 
(Portes 1996). The ethnic entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley not only frequently travel home 
to meet with business contacts, but also profit from low-cost skills and markets in Asia. 
Significantly, Indians are in a privileged position to take advantage of software 
programmers and systems analysts in India, where wages are ten times lower than in the 
US (Saxenian et al 2002). The comprehensive availability of skills in the five urban high-
tech areas of Bangalore, Bombay, Chennei, Hyderabad and Pune in India, is an essential 
prerequisite for Indian high-tech entrepreneurs to rely on such external ties. The time 
difference further makes it possible for ethnic firms, with employees in both India and the 
US, to work around the clock (Saxenian et al 2002). Thus, the under representation of 
Indians in the high-tech sector of Boston may encourage Indian entrepreneurs to rely on 
external connections to local high-tech sectors in India. Furthermore, the anticipated 
process of marginalization may force Indian minorities to use external ties as a substitute 
for integration into the Boston high-tech network.      
Alternatively, it is plausible that Indian entrepreneurs have succeeded in breaking 
down ethnic barriers and are managing to stay competitive by balancing local white and 
 54
cross-race connections. Ibarra (1993 &1995), for example, has pointed out that well-
educated successful minorities adopt tie strategies of assimilation or racial heterogeneity 
in order to reach their goals.   
 
Summary 
The goal of this chapter has been to construct a framework to guide my analysis. 
Therefore, I have presented an ideal type picture of the research setting by theoretically 
discussing the context, the actors, different aspects of the actors’ relations and their 
plausible patterns of action. I have further discussed and elaborated on crucial 
relationships and processes in the research setting that will clarify the empirical analysis. 
Moreover, I have grounded my research questions in social theory. I commenced by 
defining an ethnic entrepreneur as an individual with a certain ethnic group attachment 
who launches a firm based on incremental or revolutionizing innovation. I then 
elaborated on the organizational structure of the Boston high-tech sector where the 
entrepreneurs have set up their firms. I not only argued that the sector had transformed 
from a hierarchical organization to a network form of organization but also elucidated 
why connections have become crucial for the individual entrepreneur. Moreover, the 
intrinsic web of regional actors in the Boston high-tech sector very much resembles the 
structure of an industrial district. However, in order to fully understand the sector one 
must also consider external connections, such as national and transnational ties.  
I then moved on to a detailed description of the ideal type nature and 
characteristics of connections on the individual level, highlighting features such as tie-
strength, durability, multiplexity, complementarity and diversity. After demonstrating 
that the development of ties is a gradual and time-consuming process I specified that the 
exchanges that are carried out through an entrepreneur’s ties are smoothed by 
interpersonal similarities and past interactions. However, a new Indian entrepreneur who 
sets up his firm is not only likely to be percieved as a neophyte, but he aslo lacks the 
’correct’ identity, namely that of being the white mainstream. Accordingly Indian 
entrepreneurs may encounter strong barriers when developing their role-set and 
integrating into the local high-tech community. In addition, exclusinary pressures may 
arise as a consequence of ethnic group competition. After elucidating these relationships, 
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I am now in a position to empirically analyse the type of connections that Indian 
entrepreneurs in Boston’s high-tech sector have formed and are making use of.          
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Chapter 5 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
This chapter precedes the analysis and makes explicit the research design and the 
methodology at use when carrying out the research. The aim of the chapter is specifically 
to discuss the knowledge claims, the strategies of inquiry and the methods of data 
collection and analysis in this study. It will further address issues concerning the 
researchers identity and background, and draw conclusions on how the researchers 
positioning may have influenced the findings. Finally, the concerns of validity and the 
trustworthiness of the findings will be laid out.   
 
The Selection of the Study Site and the Participants 
The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites. As a 
result, the Boston high-tech sector was delibaretely chosen as an arena presenting a 
special opportunity for the elaboration of ethnic entrepreneur theory. The development of 
theory within the ethnic entrepreneur field has primarily been based on evidence deriving 
from immigrants and minorities in low-skilled sectors. Thus, the knowledge intensive 
nature of the Boston high-tech sector not only made this arena an intriguing and unusual 
setting to explore but also carried the potential of taking one step towards a more nuanced 
ethnic entrepreneur theory. Furthermore, the Boston region has not traditionally been a 
major destination for minorities in the US. In contrast to metropolitan areas such as Los 
Angeles, New York, Washinton DC and Houston that for close to a century have 
contained large minority populations, Boston have only recently experienced an influx of 
non-European minorities. As a result, scholars within the ethnic entrepreneur field have 
yet to discover the potential of the Boston metropolitan area as a relevant research site. 
Furthermore, the Boston high-tech sector was selected above prospective knowledge 
intensive settings in my native country, due to the actual presence of ethnic entrepreneurs 
in the Boston high-tech sector.          
The most important factor when selecting the participants for this study was to 
focus on a neglected, yet important ethnic group within the ethnic entrepreneur field. 
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According to Leonard and Tibrewal (1993 p. 143) ”there is virtually nothing available on 
Asian Indian entrepreneurs”. The Asian Indian ethnic group may be percieved as a social 
construction based on one or more of the following criteria: (a) characteristics presumed 
to be based upon shared genealogy, (b) cultural traits, including language, religion, dress, 
custom, or assumed shared history, and (c) nationality or regional origin. Based on the 
discussion in my previous chapters, I emphasized three additional factors when selecting 
participants. First, I defined an entrepreneur as an individual who launches a new venture, 
based on minimal or revolutionizing innovation. Secondly, I described an ethnic 
entrepreneur as an entrepreneur with an ethnic group attachement, by virtue of either self-
definition or ascription. Finally, the Indian entrepreneurs’ firms had to be registrered with 
one of the high-tech NAICS codes. The specific NAICS codes corresponding to high-
tech industries are all caracterized by a high degree of technological sophistication, large 
R&D expenditures and capacities, a high patent and innovation intensity, and industries 
that have a substantial technological impact on other economic sectors. In this study, I 
have followed DeVol’s (1999) selection of NAICS codes12.  
The selection of the participants was a gradual process where I first singled out 
Indian CEO:s based on their name, from databases operated by the State Office of 
Minority and Women Business Assistance. Moreover, I ensured that all firms were 
registered with one of the high-tech NAICS codes. By searching the World Wide Web, I 
was able to cement their ethnic group attachement. I collected evidence on their 
education, their firm, their involvement with the Indian community and other volunteer 
activities. Naturally, I had to exclude a few entrepreneurs that turned out to be Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi instead of Asian Indian. I further searched databases containing 
information on a majority of all the registered firms in the US and gathered evidence 
from the ’homepages’ of the entrepreneurs’ firms. As a result, I was able to determine 
whether any incremental or radical innovation had taken place within the firm. At the end 
of this process I had accquired a list of 20 Indian entrepreneurs in the Boston 
metropolitan area that fullfilled my requirements. To ensure that my selection was 
correct, I included questions in my questionnaire that would confirm or disconfirm their 
                                                 
12 DeVol used the older SIC system. As a result, I had to translate the SIC codes to NAICS codes by using 
the US Census converting tables that may be found on www.uscensus.gov.    
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identity and the innovative caracteristic of their firm. Thus, when selecting participants to 
this study, I made use of the method of triangulisation, recommended by Yin (1989) and 
Ragin (1994).     
 
The Collection of Data 
 Data on the Indian entrepreneurs were collected during May, June and July 2004. To 
ensure higher validity the data were gathered and triangulated from four different 
sources. They are 1) Public sources: company reports, entrepreneurs’ resumes and 
advertising materials 2) Questionnaires: a combination of open ended and closed-ended 
questions 3) Interviews: semi-structured face-to-face or telephone interviews 4) Complete 
observation: observing without participating. In addition to using multiple datasources, 
two types of information were sought in order to check my understanding of the 
strategies that Indian entrepreneurs adopt. I gathered 1) attribute data: attitudes, opinions, 
and behavior of agents, and 2) relational data: contact, ties, or connections between 
individuals.  
 The public sources helped me to gain insight on the technological sophistication 
of the entrepreneurs’ firms. Moreover, the documents provided an introduction to the 
entrepreneurs spatial network strategy. For example, a public document presented 
information on an entrepreneurs’ national and global partners. Public documents, such as 
entrepreneurs’ resumes posted on their firms’ homepages, were further useful when 
determining the entrepreneurs’ background, socio-economic status and regional 
anchoring.  
 A questionnaire with a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions 
was constructed in order to retrieve data on the nature and characteristics of the 
connections the entrepreneurs made use of, in the daily operations of their firm. The 
questions were generally straightforward and easy to comprehend13 and thus appropriate 
for a questionnaire. The responses on the questionnaire were later followed up and 
elaborated on during the interview. Such a two-folded strategy was selected in order to 
occupy less of the entrepreneurs’ time. The entrepreneurs represented a local minority 
                                                 
13 See Appendix 1 
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elite, who by definition are less accessible and more conscious of their own importance 
and time (Richards 1996).  
 During the semistructured interviews with the entrepreneurs, I used a protocol to 
remind myself of the themes that I wanted to discuss. These were themes that followed 
up on the entrepreneurs’ responses to the questionnaire. Furthermore, I constructed 12 
elaborative questions relating to past events, attitudes and opinions of the entrepreneurs 
that may not be explored through a questionnaire (Creswell 2003). During the dialogue, 
the entrepreneurs were able to explain the complexities of their experiences and describe 
their understanding of relevant issues. My initial goal was to conduct all my interviews in 
a face-to-face situation. However, due to the ethnic entrepreneurs’ hectic schedule and 
their general lack of time, I had to carry out some of them by telephone. Besides 
interviewing Indian entrepreneurs, I also talked to other relevant high-tech actors in the 
Boston region, such as executive directors of business forums and high-tech employees.  
 Finally, complete observation was carried out during the visits I made to some 
entrepreneurs’ offices when scheduling a meeting or interviewing a subject. These visits 
provided me with information on the spatial integration of the firms. Moreover, by 
observing the actors who turned up to discuss a prospective business opportunity or 
passed by to chat, I was able to develop a basic understanding of the entrepreneurs’ 
degree of social integration into the white, elite network. Furthemore, I also observed the 
entrepreneurs’ actions during events at local business forums where high-tech actors 
gathered to seek new information and expand their current role-set. Yet as a whole, 
complete observation was of limited importance to the analysis of this study.                           
 
Data Analysis Strategies  
Qualitative case studies, such as my own, seek to construct representations based on in-
depth detailed knowledge of cases, to correct misrepresentations or to offer new 
representations of the research subject. Moreover, the study of cases is particularly 
suitable when exploring a social phenomenon (Yin 1989), such as the tie-strategies of 
ethnic entrepreneurs. When carrying out an explorative case study, it is of vital 
importance to develop a preliminary theory related to the phenomenon being studied. Yin 
(1989) has pointed out that ”the role of theory-building, prior to the conduct of any data 
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collection, has been overlooked in the traditional way of doing case-studies”. Thus, when 
commencing this study, my first priority was to develop a rich framework in order to 
cement the study’s relevance to ethnic entrepreneur theory. More importantly, my frame 
was set fourth as a guide for my research, demonstrating which kind of factors might be 
relevant to explore. Despite the fact that it was unclear what kind of strategies atypical 
ethnic entrepreneurs in an atypical sector, in an atypical metropolis would adopt, I put 
fourth suggestive hypothesis regarding the social phenomenon. However, I was aware of 
that contrasting empirical evidence must result in a revision of the hypothesis.  
 After reviewing the ethnic entrepreneur literature and considering the insights 
from interorganizational and social network theory I analyzed the data collected from an 
initial case in the light of my theoretical framework. While keeping in mind my ideal 
frame, I proceeded to analyze the data from a second, third and fourth case and continued 
the process until all my interviews were accomplished. I thus used a multiple-case design 
in order to increase the robustness of the study. When analyzing an Indian entrepreneur’s 
role-set I specifically took into account the type of technology at use in the daily 
operations of his firm. Additionally, I considered the influence of the entrepreneurs’ 
backgrounds and experiences. Accordingly, my data analysis strategy involved a pattern 
matching and a comparative logic. The very last phase of my qualitative study was to 
draw conclusions by linking the results to social theory. The pattern matching 
methodology used may be illustrated by the following figure inspired by Yin (1989). 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Multiple case study methodology. Source: Inspired by Yin 1989   
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Positioning 
According to Flowerdew and Martin (1997), it is essential to reflect on your positionality 
when conducting qualitative research. Positionality refers to how the reseracher’s identity 
shapes the interactions with the participants of the study. A crucial aspect of positionality 
is the power relation that exists between the researcher and the interviewees. The 
assumption that the researcher usually is in a privileged position may be illustrated by a 
quote by Cindi Katz (1992 p. 496):    
 
”The research relationship is a peculiar relationship- unequally initiated, situationally 
lop-sided, spatially dislocated, temporally isolated, extrinsic in purpose- it oozes with 
power”.  
 
However, the researcher in this study did not personify the dominant position when 
conducting fieldwork. In my interviews with the local, minority elite in the Boston high-
tech sector, the entrepreneurs often had the upper hand by controlling access to 
information on their company and knowledge about their connections. I had the role of a 
supplicant, dependent on the co-operation of a relatively small number of entrepreneurs 
with the specialized characteristics I was searching for. Thus, it was not only challenging 
to get passed voice mails and executive assistants, but also to convince the entrepreneurs 
that it was worthwhile meeting with me. For example, one successful minority 
entrepreneur demonstrated his power symbolically by hanging up on me, once I had 
introduced myself as a graduate student conducting research. Moreover, when meeting 
the entrepreneurs in person I soon realized that in order to gain respect from these 
minority elites, I had to demonstrate professionalism and extensive knowledge of the 
field. The fact that I am a young woman did not make it easier. The stereotypes 
associated with gender and age made it severely difficult to convince some successful 
minority entrepreneurs that my research was worth their time. 
 However, as a consequence of my outsider position as a graduate student from 
Norway, I represented less of a threat to the ethnic entrepreneurs. For example, during the 
interview situation some entrepreneurs spoke openly about the barriers they had 
encountered when developing their network. I suspect that they had been more restrained 
if a white local student carried out the equivalent interview. Further supporting this point 
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is the fact that when the interviews took place in a public setting, such as a restaurant or a 
cafe, the interviewees would almost whisper when elaborating on the impediments they 
had faced when entering the Boston high-tech sector. Thus, I early developed an 
awareness of the sensitivity of the information I was asking for.     
 While carrying out my interviews, I further experienced that, it was easier to 
retrieve information from young, professional entrepreneurs than the more established. 
By drawing on mutual experiences, such as Indian culture, traveling, and graduate school, 
I was able to build relationships of trust to the young Asian Indian entrepreneurs. Even 
though the majority of the more established entrepreneurs expressed their generosity by 
participating in this study, a few Indian entrepreneurs were extremely conscious of their 
own importance and lack of time. They spoke with an articulated formality and were 
hesitant to convey any information not related to their professional position. 
My dual position as a graduate student and an outsider to the high-tech sector was 
initially disempowering. Yet, after I had gained access to the ethnic entrepreneurs, my 
status, as a graduate student appeared to provide some degree of ‘insidership’ with the 
entrepreneurs. Most of the entrepreneurs had extensive experience from academia and 
were familiar with the methods of inquiry. Moreover, the entrepreneurs appeared to share 
a deep respect for academia’s search for knowledge. However, two entrepreneurs 
diverged from this pattern. They were intimidated by the fact that academic research 
tends to be published in some way. Both of these entrepreneurs refused to convey any 
information about their firm or their connections, even after I had explained that no 
information would be published on any individual basis. 
 
Protection of Human Subjects from Harm 
According to Babbie (1992 p. 471) the definition of harm includes ”emotional and 
psychological distress, as well as physical harm”. A number of steps were taken to 
address any potential for harming or causing discomfort to the participants of this study. 
First, the research design, procedures, questionnaire and interview topics were made 
available to the University of Oslo, through my supervisor, for review and approval. 
Secondly, I informed my participants of the procedure and the topics of the questions that 
I intended to ask. I further ensured that all the interviewees were aware of the fact that 
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there responses on the questionnaire or the interview would not be published on any 
individual basis. Finally, once I realized the sensitivity of questions relating to the 
barriers minorities are facing, I tried to select non-public or less-public spaces for the 
interviews, such as the offices of the entrepreneurs and the green areas surrounding them.           
 
Validity 
The following steps were taken in order to increase the validity, or in other words the 
accuracy and credibility of the findings. I used multiple methods (text analyzing, 
questionnaires, interviews and complete observation) to try to maximize my 
understanding of my research questions as well as the trustworthiness of my conclusions. 
I also developed an awareness of the bias of the researcher by articulating my positioning 
early in the process. Since I hade the opportunity to spend prolonged time in the field 
(January 2004-November 2004) I was able to develop a deeper understanding of the 
context and the actors of interest. Moreover, in order to secure that my questionnaire and 
my interview topics were firmly rooted in my research questions, my supervisor reviewed 
them. I also strived to operate with a language comprehensible and suitable to business 
elites. Finally, in the last stages of the research process I made use of peer debriefing to 
ensure that my analysis made sense to others than the researcher.  
Despite the preventive measures undertaken to increase the validity of the study, 
uncontrollable factors may have biased the findings of my research. A few issues require 
attention. First, a few entrepreneurs expressed an exceptional awareness of social 
network theory. These entrepreneurs had often recently finished a master’s degree or a 
PhD. Thus, it is plausible that their responses to my questionnaire and my interview are 
influenced by their knowledge of the field.     
 Another issue of validity concerns the selection of entrepreneurs. My initial intent 
was to strive for variation when singling out Asian entrepreneurs for my study. This was 
not an attempt to make the case representative to a larger population, but rather an effort 
to design a more compelling and illustrative case. Moreover, my aspiration was to 
include entrepreneurs from a range of different technologies in order to provide a 
comprehensive answer to research question “c”. However, the fact that all public 
databases containing listings of Asian Indian entrepreneurs were biased in some way or 
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another, made it hard to pursue this ambition. For example, the State Office of Minority 
and Women Business Assistance’s database from which I selected a majority of my 
participants, was set up to increase minorities’ involvement in the public sector. 
Furthermore, only the entrepreneurs from IT/software functioned according to the 
network logic that I have outlined in chapter four. As a result, I was unable to convince 
more than one Indian entrepreneur from engineering industries, the industry where most 
Indian entrepreneurs are concentrated, to participate in my study. Additionally, a few 
entrepreneurs that I had selected for my study refused to talk to me, arguing that they 
were not successful enough. As a consequence of these unintended factors, it is likely that 
my case only includes a certain stratum of Indian entrepreneurs.    
 Finally, In order to explore the barriers the entrepreneurs had faced when entering 
the Boston high-tech sector, I had to ask them questions based on past activities. The 
trustworthiness of the subjects’ memory is not complete and the answers may thus lack in 
detail. However, I tried to ask them several questions addressing the same issue to 
improve the accuracy and holism of their answers.  
  
Trustworthiness of the Findings 
In order to facilitate that the operations of my study may be repeated with the same 
results, I have made my questionnaire and interview protocol public, by including them 
as an appendix in the end of this thesis. Since I was the sole interviewer, I also prevented 
the possibility of introducing incompatible interviewing styles.  
It is believed that in-depth, qualitative studies, in general, generate more accurate 
and reliable depictions of participants than quantitative studies. This is due to the fact that 
the interviewer is able to draw on factors such as shared experience and identity to 
produce a rich detailed conversation based on empathy and mutual respect (Flowerdew & 
Martin 1997). In this study, I made use of our mutual experience from academia and 
various international settings to build a more reliable report.       
Yet, when doing qualitative research the positioning of the researcher will always 
influence the conclusion of the study. Therefore, it is plausible that an older male 
researcher, for example, would have retrieved alternative information from the 
interviews, resulting in a different conclusion than mine. Furthermore, the limited amount 
 66
of time spent with each interviewee in conjunction with my lack of experience from high-
tech environments may have prevented me from posing sufficient and precise questions.    
 
Generalizibility 
The conclusions of this study are derived from data gathered from nine cases of Indian 
entrepreneurs. Since this study methodologically represents a case-oriented approach, the 
conclusions are generalizible to theoretical propositions only, and not to populations or 
universes. The role of this study is thus to contribute to ethnic entrepreneur theory by 
linking the results to a broader framework. In other words, the research may only be 
subject to analytical generalization (Yin 1989). 
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Chapter 6 
Findings: The Connections at Use 
 
In an effort to understand the social tie-strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs in a knowledge 
intensive sector, this chapter will present data from my fieldwork and analyze the 
connections that nine Indian entrepreneurs in the Boston high-tech sector have formed 
and are making use of in the daily operations of their firms. My approach is sequential 
and commences with a discussion on how the interviewees initially developed their 
connections. It is followed by an in depth analysis of the specific ties the Indian 
entrepreneurs make use of on a day-to-day basis to keep their firms at the competitive 
edge. Before I summerize the findings and return to the objective of this thesis, I 
investigate the impact of technology on my interviewees’ role-sets. First a few words 
about the background of the nine Indian entrepreneurs and their respective firms.      
 
The Entrepreneurs and their Firms 
The nine Indian entrepreneurs interviewed in this case-study conformed almost perfectly 
to the general life and career path of Asian Indians in the region. Moreover, the 
interviewees had remarkably similar backgrounds in many aspects. For example, the 
entrepreneurs had immigrated to the US after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 was passed. Seven of the entrepreneurs who mostly specialized in software related 
industries had immigrated as late as the 1980s or 1990s. The two other entrepreneurs, 
concentrated in engineering and architectural services, had immigrated immediately after 
the US removed the national quota system in 1965. Accordingly, the Indian entrepreneurs 
in this case study were all part of the so-called ‘professional stream’ of immigrants. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that none of the entrepreneurs had been born in the US. 
Another characteristic that the interviewees held in common was their high levels of 
education. Aside one exception, the lowest professional degree obtained by the 
entrepreneurs was a master’s degree. The identification with higher social classes was 
also evident among the nine Indian entrepreneurs. During the interviews, the Indian 
entrepreneurs demonstrated a consciousness of the notion that they were part of a 
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professional and affluent community. “In childhood, we (Indians) are taught to perform 
and achieve” explained one entrepreneur. They also seemed to be aware of their role as a 
‘model’ minority in the US. The Indian entrepreneurs communicated class through the 
same status signs as the white American elite, namely expensive cars, clothes and 
traveling.  
The standard career path of the interviewed entrepreneurs was to complete a 
bachelor’s degree in India and pursue a master’s degree or a PhD in the US. Thereafter, 
the Indian entrepreneurs would hold a job in the Boston region for an extended period 
before launching their own firm. As a result, all but one interviewee were student- turned 
immigrants. As of today, the entrepreneurs had become permanent residents, holding 
greencards, or citizens of the US. An additional shared trait among the entrepreneurs was 
their perfect knowledge of the English language. Their vocabulary was extensive and I 
could not perceive that they had any problems interacting in an English business 
environment. However, the two entrepreneurs that immigrated in the late 1960’s diverged 
from this pattern. Their English was heavily accented and they had difficulties 
understanding the questions that I posed.  
While the Indian entrepreneurs had no intentions of moving back to their native 
country, they continued to uphold strong connections to India. One entrepreneur 
explained that he traveled back and forth between India and the US several times per 
year. Others made less frequent trips to India. The nine entrepreneurs did not only keep in 
touch with fellow Indians in their native country, but they were also involved with the 
Indian community in the Boston region. One entrepreneur described his engagement with 
local Indian organizations as “giving back to my community what they once gave me”.                       
 Despite the fact that I found the nine Indian entrepreneurs to share many 
significant characteristics, their experiences also diverged in many aspects. When 
relevant, I will focus attention on the interviewees’ unique experience that has influenced 
their social tie approach and the kind of connections they developed. The following 
narrative may demonstrate the twists and variations of the experiences of the nine Indian 
entrepreneurs. 
 
I grew up in the Gujarati region in India. After high school, I studied at the college of 
engineering in Nagpur, India. From there, I went to Great Britain to study business 
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administration. One of my advicors there happened to be an Indian professor. We 
became good friends and kept in touch even after he had moved to the US for a 
professorship at a Massachusetts university. This professor eventually launched his own 
software firm here in Boston. That’s how I came to the US- he actually offered me a job 
at his firm. So I did the paper work and started at his firm in 1992. Four years later, I 
teamed up with two other more experienced Indian colleagues. We decided to start our 
own business. Today we have about hundred employees including a development center 
in Bangalore, India.     
 
The entrepreneur depicted in the narrative owns an exceptionally large firm. Only two of 
the Indian entrepreneurs in this case study ran firms with about hundred employees. In 
fact, six interviewees represented firms with fewer than 25 employees while one 
entrepreneur’s staff exceeded 30.  However, all my interviewees’ companies would be 
considered small when applying the US small business administration’s classification of 
firms14. Accordingly, they conformed to the recent trend in the Boston high-tech milieu 
where small firms are considered to be the greatest driver of the sector.  
 The Indian entrepreneurs in this case study represented some fascinating 
companies. While some interviewees had sought out exceptionally specialized market 
niches, others where striving to diversify their products and services. The entrepreneurs’ 
companies may be divided into three categories: six entrepreneurs ran firms with IT and 
software related products and services, one entrepreneur represented a company with 
engineering services and finally, two entrepreneurs offered architectural services. In the 
software industries, for example, one Indian entrepreneur explained to me that his firm 
was a wide provider of software solutions to industries such as financial services, health 
care, manufacturing/retail and government/education. “We provide a range of services 
that cover the complete application life cycle including project management, analysis, 
design, construction, testing, migration, management and integration”. Another 
entrepreneur in a related industry had concentrated in a more narrow market niche and 
offered computer based mapping services (GIS) and CAD conversions. The one 
entrepreneur in engineering had specialized in the energy field. “Because the staff at my 
firm”, he explained, “includes engineers, economists and lawyers, we are intimately 
familiar with the technical aspects of energy and environmental activities”. “We target 
emissions reduction and plant efficiency”. Naturally, the type of services offered at the 
                                                 
14 www.sba.gov  
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engineering firm drastically differed from the services provided by the computer related 
companies. Finally, the firms in architectural services had been involved in projects 
ranging from space planning to architectural designed business, commercial and 
residential buildings. “Our office is fully automated with state-of-the-art technology”, 
stressed one of the Indian architects.                  
 Despite the entrepreneurs’ differentiation in specialization, products and services 
they all shared the same goals of innovation, growth and profit. The nine Indian 
entrepreneurs had not only based their start-ups on an incremental innovation in a service 
or product, but had also ensured that their firm continouosly innovated. “It’s impossible 
to survive without innovating”, exclaimed one of the software entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, when asked to describe the sophistication of technology at use in the daily 
operations of their firm, the entrepreneurs used expressions such as “very advanced”, 
“state-of-the-art” and “exceptionally sophisticated”. Their ambitions for growth and 
profit were evident when looking at the achievements of the various firms. For example, 
one Indian entrepreneur was the winner of the ‘Distinguished Small Firm 
Accomplishment Award’. Another had been qualified for the New England Technology 
Fast 50 program. This program nominates the 50 most rapid growth companies in the 
region, based on a five-year revenue growth. Other visible signs of profit and growth 
among the nine entrepreneurs were rapid increase in employees and spatial and 
technological expansion.   
 
The Development of Connections 
When analyzing the fieldwork data, I found that the different categories of entrepreneurs 
(IT/software, engineering services and architectural services) used their connections so 
differently that they must be analyzed separately. Accordingly, the following two 
sections will solely discuss the IT/software entrepreneurs while the entrepreneurs from 
engineering and architectural services will be analyzed independently in the third 
subsection. 
 The Indian entrepreneurs who specialized in computer related industries were 
neither surprised nor confused when I asked them for an interview concerning their 
connections that they used during the daily operation of their firm. On the contrary, they 
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demonstrated a complete awareness of the importance of connections. Moreover, they 
could, without difficulty, name about ten ties that were especially important to their firm 
and which they spent a considerable amount of time maintaining. Those who specialized 
in computer sciences specifically believed that connections were absolutely critical when 
starting up your own firm. “You need a lot of guidance and advice as a prospective 
entrepreneur”, explained one of the more experienced software entrepreneurs. When the 
entrepreneurs were asked to name the three most important prerequisites to start up a 
high-tech firm, they typically included connections as one of the necessities. For 
example, one Indian software entrepreneur responded “You have to have a really good 
idea. Equally important is to have that extra special kind of passion. Then, of course, you 
need a lot of connections”. Further supporting the critical role of contacts during the early 
growth period is the fact that all the software/IT entrepreneurs mentioned ‘connections’ 
as the primary reason for locating their firm in the Boston region.  
 The decision to launch ones own firm had been made several years before the 
actual start-up. In three instances, it was an ambition the entrepreneurs had worked 
towards since childhood. One entrepreneur revealed that in his culture, children are raised 
to believe that the greatest achievement is to set up, or to run, ones own business. 
Accordingly, the IT/software entrepreneurs had given themselves plenty of time to 
prepare for, and research, the prospective sector where they would eventually launch their 
firm. In a similar way, the time-span had given them the opportunity to develop some 
initial relations necessary for the venture. For example, the entrepreneurs had been 
residents in the Boston region for 13 years, on average, before setting up their own firm. 
The field research revealed that a familiarity with the local high-tech milieu was crucial 
in order to successfully launch a high-tech firm. However, due to the different 
experiences and backgrounds of the Indian entrepreneurs, they used individual methods 
to reach a similar goal: the development of initial connections in the local high-tech 
sector. I observed four different approaches. Yet, some of the Indian entrepreneurs made 
use of two or more of the identified methods. First, entrepreneurs had the opportunity to 
take advantage of a research environment while pursuing graduate school at a local 
university. While they were working towards their graduate degree, Indian entrepreneurs 
in this case study focused on developing enduring relationships to key personnel on the 
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faculty at their respective educational institutions. Faculty, who often consisted of well-
connected individuals, could then refer them to other individuals who might be crucial in 
the launching process. In other words, the pattern of transferring trust from an existing 
relationship to a newly established one was evident in the attempts of the Indian 
entrepreneurs to develop connections. Furthermore, one entrepreneur explained to me 
that when he pursued his MBA at a regional univerity he was not only able to develop 
relations to like-minded student mates, but also had the opportunity to form connections 
to local industry through the internships they were assigned. A second approach consisted 
of participating in the local Indian, high-tech business forum, the Indus Entrepreneurs15 
(TiE) that offered monthly lectures on the problems and impediments high-tech 
entrepreneurs encounter when running their firms. The lectures were constantly followed 
by a networking hour where entrepreneurs would get to know each other over a drink or a 
light dinner. Some of the lectures would specifically target prospective entrepreneurs. 
During these specific events, representatives from venture capital firms, banks and real 
estate agencies would participate and introduce the prospective entrepreneurs to relevant 
resources in the local environment. Accordingly, the Indian entrepreneurs in my case 
study who had pursued this approach had been able to form ties to both general actors in 
the environment and more experienced Indian entrepreneurs. Interestingly, they called the 
latter a ‘mentor’ relationship. The president of TiE16 claims that the cross-generational 
mentorship relation has a long tradition in Indian culture originating from the guru-chela 
relation (teacher-student relation). A third method was to rely on connections to co-ethnic 
friends in the Boston area. These Indian friends were often relatives or other friendships 
that had been formed as a result of the immigration process to the US. As I have already 
mentioned, one entrepreneur could benefit from a friendship to an Indian former 
professor who had immigrated to the US from Great Britain. Thus, in this particular 
instant, a social relation was turned into an economic and business connection. Finally, 
developing some initial connections through a job in a high-tech firm in Boston was a 
method all the entrepreneurs in the computer related industries had pursued. When asked 
specifically about what kind of experience was the most important for the development of 
                                                 
15 To be discussed thoroughly in a following section 
16 www.tie-boston.org  
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ties, an entrepreneur typically responded: “to have a regular job in the high-tech sector”. 
Thus, Indian entrepreneurs in this case study had not only spent several years in an 
established high-tech firm such as Digital Equipment Corporation, but had also been 
professionally successful at their job. One interviewee informed me that when he 
functioned as a manager for a high-tech firm, his strategies had resulted in “the business 
growing from $5.3 million to $38 million in five years”. Accordingly, the IT and 
software entrepreneurs had the opportunity to gradually become familiar with different 
high-tech actors, high-tech firms and the general business environment in the Boston 
region through their jobs. Despite the different type or types of approaches that were used 
by the Indian entrepreneurs in this case study, the common factor was that they utilized 
the means in their approximate environment. This is in accordance with social theory 
suggesting that the inter-personal ties of the entrepreneur are specifically important in the 
early phases of the venture (Brown & Butler 1993). Moreover, the different methods used 
to establish some initial contacts that would be relevant for the start-up resembles an 
attempt to establish a regional affiliation to compensate for their outsider status as 
immigrants to the US.  
Despite the efforts to establish a regional affiliation and become familiar with the 
actors in the high-tech sector through individual approaches, Indian entrepreneurs used 
words such as ‘complicated’, ‘not so smooth’ and ‘hard’ to describe the forming of some 
initial connections. “You don’t know who is out there, who can introduce you to 
customers. It’s a process of building up trust”, explained one of the entrepreneurs. Thus, 
being what Granovetter has called ‘a neophyte’ seemed to be a virtual obstacle when 
building relationships in the Boston high-tech environment. Moreover, by describing the 
development of some initial connections as a ‘process’ the entrepreneur confirms Larsson 
and Starr’s (1993) suggestion that actors gradually, in stages, expand and strengthen their 
relations. Another interviewee claimed, in a similar way, that the most challenging factor 
when developing connections was that “people were not familiar with the product I was 
offering. They couldn’t relate to it”. Finally, a third entrepreneur asserted that he himself 
was at fault for making the process of forming ties to other high-tech actors severely 
complicated. He explained that his ideas for the venture had not matured. “I had a lack of 
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understanding of my focus. I didn’t really know what I was doing which resulted in 
developing the wrong sorts of ties”. 
 
The Connections in the Daily Operations of the Firm  
As discussed above, the role-set of the Indian entrepreneurs at time of firm set-up 
typically consisted of friends, university mates, colleagues and other acquaintances in the 
entrepreneurs’ immediate surroundings. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs had spent an 
extended period of time in the Boston region, in order to develop enough connections to 
draw on in the early days of the firm’s development. However, in the more established 
phase of the firm, the Indian entrepreneurs in this case study typically had to search for, 
and select, a few connections that provided them with sufficient resources and 
information critical to the daily operations of their firm. The issue was opportunity cost. 
In other words, due to the time and effort required to maintain a connection, the Indian 
entrepreneurs were forced to limit the ties they used on a routine-basis. Accordingly, 
interviewees maintained, on average, ten connections for the daily operations of the firm, 
while additional contacts where used more irregularly. Yet, the role-set used on a day-to-
day basis was by no means static. One of the entrepreneurs explained to me that “when 
the market changes, one has to form new connections”. Another interviewee stressed that 
“I have to develop my connections constantly to stay competitive”. When taking into 
consideration the durability of the entrepreneurs’ connections, the ‘snapshot’ of the 
respective role-sets the entrepreneurs provided me with appeared to be relatively stable 
over time. In the following, I will systematically analyze significant features of the Indian 
entrepreneurs’ role-sets, commencing with informative connections.           
 The field research revealed that informative ties were exceptionally important for 
the entrepreneurs. An interviewee informed me that the expenses of an established 
software firm tend to be distributed between general and administrative costs (G&A), 
research and development (R&D), and sales and marketing. While G&A and R&D 
together make up 30% of the costs, sales and marketing amounts to 50% of the overall 
expenses. To reduce the cost of sales and marketing, explained the interviewee, it is 
crucial for an entrepreneur to single out contacts that consistently provide him with 
information on prospective clients and new markets. In other words, maintaining ‘the 
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correct’ informative ties appeared to be a competitive advantage for the interviewees in 
computer related industries. The field research further revealed that while the initial 
connections of the Indian entrepreneurs had consisted of friends and acquaintances, the 
informative ties used on a regular basis in the established phase of the firm mainly 
involved other firms. In fact, the Indian entrepreneurs specifically preferred to learn from 
firms, such as clients and suppliers. Moreover, in contrast to social theory, universities 
and research institutions did not function as a significant information source in the daily 
operations of the entrepreneurs’ firms. The preference for seeking out information from 
other firms reflected the entrepreneurs need for specific knowledge and not general 
information. The knowledge that may solve immediate needs is most likely to be found in 
other firms in the context of the high-tech industrial district.  
 While theory suggests that the optimum informative ties are weak rather than 
strong, the interviewees argued that “trust” was the critical aspect of the informative 
contacts used on a regular basis. A CEO will not reveal any sensitive information to 
someone he has not built up a relationship with, explained one of the entrepreneurs. The 
strength of the informative ties was further reflected in their multiplexity and durability. 
For example, it was typical for an informative tie to also function as a collaboration 
partner on innovative activity. Moreover, the informative relationships had been 
developed over an extended period of time, often over several years. Yet, the 
interviewees’ informative ties were not only of a strong character, but they also had a 
perfectly diverse structure. In fact, the field data demonstrated that the entrepreneurs’ 
contacts were diverse beyond the original, theoretical meaning of diversity. I found that 
the Indian entrepreneurs had developed informative ties that were socially, spatially and 
ethnically diverse. The interviewees maintained between four and five informative 
connections on a regular basis. In the social meaning of diversity, none of these contacts 
were acquainted to each other. However, the interviewees were not aware of the socially 
diverse structure of their informative role-set. Interestingly, the specific structure of their 
informative connections was an uncalculated consequence of the entrepreneurs’ attempt 
to form contacts that consistently offered them critical information on prospective 
markets. As a result, and illustrated by figure six, the interviewees received unique 
information from each contact.  
 76
 
Figure 6. A model of the diverse structure of the interviewees’ informative ties. 
 
Especially intriguing, was the fact that one of the software entrepreneurs did not conform 
to the above illustrated structure of the informative ties. In contrast, all but two of his 
connections knew each other “very well”. However, this particular Indian entrepreneur’s 
firm was still in the early stages of growth (defined as the two first years) while the other 
entrepreneurs’ firms had reached a mature status (firms over 5 years old). Thus, the 
entrepreneur’s firm in the early stages of growth had not yet been through the transitional 
phase, were friends and acquaintances are replaced or supplemented by connections to 
firms. Naturally, friends and acquaintances are more likely to know each other than 
independent CEOs. As a result, and demonstrated by figure seven, this specific Indian 
entrepreneur did not have access to as many unique information sources as the more 
established entrepreneurs.  
 
Figure 7. A model of the structure of the informative ties of the entrepreneur in the early 
growth period. 
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The Indian entrepreneurs in this case study also maintained spatially diverse, informative 
connections. While ties to other firms in the local high-tech sector were the most 
important, all the entrepreneurs had one or more informative contact in another national 
or global high-tech sector. For example, one entrepreneur upheld informative ties to 
actors in Silicon Valley. “That is where the innovation takes place”, he explained. “I 
learn from the market there”. Other entrepreneurs maintained external ties to other high-
tech districts such as Bangalore, New York, Texas, and Singapore, depending on their 
prior individual experience. The interviewees believed that these external connections 
provided them with unique and crucial information they were incapable of receiving from 
the local informative ties. 
Finally, the Indian entrepreneurs were convinced that relying on ethnically diverse   
informative connections was beneficial. One entrepreneur explained that as an Indian you 
not only have the opportunity to receive crucial information from mainstream actors in 
the high-tech sector, but you also have an additional ethnic community with high-tech 
experts to take advantage of. Yet, the informative role-sets were predominantly white and 
only supplemented with co-ethnic contacts. Surprisingly, co-Asian (excluding Indian) ties 
were completely absent in the Indian entrepreneurs’ role-set. When taking into 
consideration the actual presence of Asian high-tech entrepreneurs in the Boston high-
tech sector as well as the suggested existence (see Sheth 1995, Hirabayaski 1998) of a 
Pan-Asian identity, it is puzzling that Asian connections do not play a more important 
role. However, it is worth noting, that I was not able to identify any signs of prejudice 
towards other minority entreprenenurs among the interviewees. It is plausible that the 
absence of Pan-Asian connections is correlated with a strategic factor, such as time 
efficiency. One of the interviewees offered a slightly different explanation, stressing that 
the Chinese were the sole Asian group significantly represented in the Boston high-tech 
milieu. Due to the Chinese entrepreneurs’ limited knowledge of the English language, the 
Chinese much prefer to interact within their own ethnic group, she claimed. Thus, 
according to my interviewee, it is the insularity of the Chinese high-tech community that 
prevents Pan-Asian cooperation. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that none of the Indian 
entrepreneurs had developed or upheld any informative ties to Black American high-tech 
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entrepreneurs, one of the other minority groups represented in the Boston high-tech 
sector.    
While the computer based entrepreneurs in this case study spent a considerable 
amount of time nurturing their informative, strong connections, they also interacted with 
several weaker contacts on an irregular basis. These were typically contacts they met 
from time to time at the monthly events of a business forum. The interviewees would take 
advantage of one or more of the local, high-tech business forums for informative 
purposes. The business forums would invite selected entrepreneurs and other high-tech 
actors who would offer briefings on recent market trends, discussions on shared 
obstacles, and workshops on future opportunities in the global high-tech industry. More 
importantly, the business forums would bring together like-minded entrepreneurs in an 
informal and non-obligatory environment. Nonetheless, not all local business forums 
appeared to be instrumental. One interviewee revealed that “I was once involved in this 
networking forum that didn’t help me at all. So I quit. Now, I am involved in two very 
central and well functioning groups: Business Networking International and 
Massachusetts Software and Internet Council”. Other business forums that were 
mentioned were TiE, Software Services Business Forum, 128 Venture Capital Group, 
MIT Enterprise Forum and Massachusetts High-Tech.                 
 Having analyzed the Indian entrepreneurs efforts to develop and maintain 
informative ties, I found that their behavior paralleled what the scholarly literature 
(Malecki & Poehling 1999, Oinas & Malecki 2002) has labeled ‘extroverts’. Malecki and 
Poehling, for example, have distinguished between ‘extrovert’ and ‘introvert’ firms 
depending on how active and successful they are in obtaining information from sources 
beyond their firm’s boundaries. Hence, the Indian entrepreneurs in this case study have 
the characteristics of extroverts, representing “outward looking” firms, constantly 
searching for the crucial knowledge that will keep them at the competitive edge. Their 
extroverted behavior encourage them to look beyond the local environment to seek 
information that will enable innovation other than that along the local high-tech district’s 
technological trajectory. 
 The field research further revealed that strength was a critical characteristic of the 
interviewees’ connections, irrespective of the resources that flowed through them. As 
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mentioned above, even the entrepreneurs’ informative sources included durable and 
intense relationships that were used on a routine basis. Interviewees reflected the concept 
of strength in what they called “trust”. Trust was typically mentioned as a prerequisite for 
a well functioning tie. Hence, from my understanding, trust, or what social theory has 
called ‘strength’, was the governing mechanism in the Indian entrepreneurs’ day-to-day 
role-set. According to my expectations, strong relationships were a necessity for 
obtaining resources and collaborating on innovative activity.  
As mentioned in my theory chapter, social network theory suggests that 
measuring the strength of a relationship includes looking at the frequency of interactions, 
the number of resources transferred through the tie, and the durability of the connection. 
When taking these factors into consideration, each entrepreneur in this case study 
possessed a qualitatively strong role-set. For example, ties were typically stable over a 
period of two to four years. Supportive contacts had the tendency to have aged with the 
entrepreneur for an extensive period, frequently over a decade. Furthermore, the 
interviews had their equivalent share of multiplex ties in their role-sets and typically met 
with their connections on a weekly or monthly basis. The homogenous pattern of strong 
relationships made me inquire into the origins of the strength. Interestingly, I found that 
the intensity of the interviewees’ connections derived from the following sources: spatial 
proximity, emotion and a shared business vision.  
Spatial strength originates from a shared regional affiliation. The actors in such a 
relationship share a regional industrial purpose and a social consensus. Accordingly, they 
are profoundly familiar with local ways of perceiving economic and technical problems 
and support the development of local informal support that encourages innovation, skill 
formation and the circulation of ideas among firms. The actors are further able to enhance 
the trust of the connection by regularly interacting on a face-to-face basis. Additionally, 
regional actors are likely to run into each other by coincidense at local high-tech events, 
such as business forums, trade shows and venture capital forums. Hence, as may be 
illustrated by figure eight, the strength of local connections originates from the 
organizational and spatial proximity. The interviewees maintained both spatially strong 
white and co-ethnic connections.  
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Figure 8. A model of the strength of the connections in one of the entrepreneur’s role-set 
 
Emotional strength concerns the degree of intimacy in the relationship. Intimacy                           
tends to increase the ease of communication and improve the trustworthiness of behavior.  
As may be demonstrated by figure eight, the interviewees’ local and co-ethnic 
relationships were specifically intimate in nature. For example, one of the Indian 
entrepreneurs described a co-ethnic contact as the following: 
 
He actually lives in the neighborhood. He is a business colleague, a technology contact 
and a closer friend.   
  
In contrast, the same entrepreneur defined a cross-race, national tie in the following 
manner: 
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He is a British contact living in California. He is the only representative of this British 
firm in the US. When I got in contact with the (British) firm, he was the one they 
referred me to. I don’t see him much outside work.     
 
It is the interpersonal similarity that produces the extra intimacy that characterizes co-
ethnic, local connections. Similarity of identity not only engenders common interests and 
worldviews but also a unique predictability crucial to entrepreneurs in a volatile sector. 
However, as demonstrated by figure eight, cross-race ties were not the only category of 
connections lacking in emotional strength. Intriguingly, co-ethnic ties from local high-
tech centers in India were referred to by the interviewees as “pure business ties”. In other 
words, despite similar interpersonal identity, co-ethnic global ties were not as intimate in 
nature as the local co-ethnic connections. The paradox may be explained by the fact that 
the shared experience of immigration among co-ethnic local actors strengthens ethnic 
identities that may not have been so strong in India. Distinctiveness theory, for example, 
suggests that similarity is relative to the context. That implies that “people in a social 
context tend to identify with others with whom they share characteristics that are 
relatively rare in the context” (Mehra et al 1998, p 442). Thus, two Indian entrepreneurs 
that develop an emotionally strong relationship in a white context, may not even have 
noticed each other, based on ethnicity, in an Indian context. 
 Finally, the field data revealed that the strength of a relationship might stem from 
a stable business partnership. The Indian entrepreneurs reflected a tie with strong 
business obligations as a “business friend”. The interviewees compensated the lack of 
intimacy in this category of connections with a shared vision of “growing for the future”. 
The partners were strongly aware of the mutual benefits deriving from a longlasting and 
reliable connection. Furthermore, as figure eight demonstrates, spatial proximity had no 
impact on the business strength of a relationship. 
However, it is important to note that the strength of the entrepreneurs’ ties is the 
researcher’s interpretation in light of the scholarly literature on industrial districts. For 
example, some sociologists grounded in a very contrasting framework (Wilson 1998, 
Yoo 1998 ) maintain that strong ties must inevitably contain an emotional dimension. The 
same scholars also claim that strong ties are generally not utilitarian or economicaly 
instrumental but are rather affectionate relations to family, kin and close friends. A study 
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on migration networks following this specific sociological definition of strong ties 
(Wilson 1998) envisions a series of concentric rings describing the continuum from the 
strongest to the weakest connections. It is plausible that strong ties in view of the 
industrial district framework would be placed in Wilson’s very outer concentric ring. In 
the industrial district literature, trust, durability, frequent interactions, and multiplexity 
are the determining attributes of stronger ties. Stronger ties are further contrasted to arms-
length ties in which costs are everything and where actors do not have an interest in their 
partners’ survival and success. Moreover, when focusing attention on actors’ connections 
in an industrial district, researchers are solely interested in ties that somehow are of utility 
and contribute to an actors’ firm. Accordingly, the strength of relations must be 
considered context dependant.     
The interviewees believed that maintaining ties to local firms, organizations and 
business forums was specifically crucial for the competitiveness of their firms. 
Furthermore, they were convinced that spatial integration would facilitate social 
integration into the local high-tech industrial district. For example, one entrepreneur 
mentioned the “presence of other high-tech firms” as the major reason for locating his 
firm along Route 128. Another entrepreneur claimed that “connections” and the 
“availability of talent in the area” attracted him to set up his firm in Cambridge. Thus, as 
may be illustrated by figure nine, the interviewees had located their firms in the high-tech 
agglomerations in Cambridge and along the following high-tech routes: 128, 495 and 93.  
 
 
Figure 9. The location of the inteviewees’ firms. Source of the map: the US Census 
Bureau  
 
140 miles across 
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Thus, in contrast to a few Chinese high-tech entrepreneurs who have chosen to locate  
their firms in Chinatown17, a local ethnic enclave, the Indian entrepreneurs in this case 
study had perfectly integrated into the agglomerations of high-tech industry in the Boston 
metropolitan area. The spatial location of their firms was further an effort to demonstrate 
their incorporation and understanding of local industrial behavior and values. By setting 
up their firms within the high-tech agglomerations, they were not only in geographical 
proximity to other similar firms, but also to business forums critical for informative 
purposes. One entrepreneur revealed that it was important for him to be located close to 
his previous employer. Colleagues from his former workplace would function as advisers 
and sources of information on new technology. Hence, the entrepreneurs’ decision to 
locate within the high-tech agglomerations was not only an effort to enhance their 
regional affiliation but also of direct practical necessity. Moreover, and exemplified by 
the photo below, the Indian entrepreneurs’ offices were typically situated in a multi-story 
office building along the highway, surrounded by similar high-tech firms. 
  
 
 
Photo no 1. A typical business building in the high-tech agglomeration of Cambridge 
                                                 
17 www.uscensus.gov See 5% PUMS data 2000 
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While the Indian entrepreneurs perceived spatial integration into the local high-tech 
milieu as a priority when setting up their firms, they also believed that social integration 
namely, the development of local cross-ethnic (white) contacts was necessary for 
functioning effectively in a white-dominated context. “The regional environment is most 
important for the day-to-day operations”, explained one interviewee. More specifically, 
the field data revealed that local cross-ethnic ties were predominantely used to decrease 
the costs of the sales and marketing process. As mentioned in a previous section, a typical 
software firm used 50% of their annual revenues to expand their clientele base. Thus, the 
local high-tech network assisted the interviewees in keeping abreast on opportunities in 
the market. In the words of one of my Indian interviewees:  
 
My local white connections are most important from a marketing and sales perspective. 
They help me get in touch with new clients. 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees were convinced that integration into the local high-tech 
network was significant for spurring innovative activity within the firm. Innovation 
occurred in three seperate, but complementary, processes in my interviewees’ firms. 
First, the interviewees used connections to non-client high-tech firms to come up with 
new ideas. Secondly, innovation was a collaborative process between the entrepreneurs’ 
firms and their clients. Finally, innovation occurred within the firms R&D department or 
through ties to an external development center. While the third innovative process was 
unrestrained by spatial proximity, the two first processes were dependant on connections 
within the local high-tech network. Accordingly, integration into the Boston high-tech 
milieu was fundamental for several reasons.  
However, the interviewees did not perceive the local high-tech milieu as receptive to 
minorities. Two of the entrepreneurs claimed that their view of Boston as a non-inclusive 
environment was based on personal experience. Interestingly, one of the entrepreneurs 
contrasted the Boston high-tech sector with Silicon Valley. “It’s not like the west coast 
here”, he explained. “It’s more difficult. Silicon Valley is like another country.” He also 
revealed that he had rather set up his company on the west coast, but family relations tied 
him to Boston. The other interviewees grounded the hostility of the milieu on the actual 
numbers of minority high-tech establishments. The skepticism towards the foreign stream 
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of high-tech professionals has been reflected in the local media. Jim Marone, the editor of 
Mass High-Tech18 wrote at the end of last year that “to say the labor market in high-tech 
is complex is like saying quantum physics is hard. There’s the H-1B visa program; the L-
1 visa program19; the burgeoning trend of outsourcing high-skill jobs to places like 
Russia, India, China and Brazil; and real people here in New England and across the 
country out of work.” The hostility towards foreign workers is spurred by the fact that   
94 000 computer scientist in the US are unemployed. A popular opinion is that 
unemployment is connected to some foreigners willingness to work long hours for less 
compensation than their white counterparts. The Boston Globe told the story of the 
software programmer John Malley on November 3, 2003.  
 
John Malley trained the foreign programmer who replaced him in his own Boston 
office. Malley, 41, lost his job the following spring. Neither he nor his partners will say 
why. But when he left, Partners gave one of the Indians his job. Malley has yet to find 
steady programming work, and he blames the visa program.   
 
Nonetheless, analysts who study workplace issues20 call workers’ anger towards the H-
1B visa program misplaced. High-tech companies in the Boston region only use H-1B 
workers to fill jobs for which they cannot find qualified Americans. Moreover, the local 
government has recently set up detailed rules for how much professionals in the high-tech 
industries must be paid. Hence, the hiring of foreign workers goes on despite the 
lingering unemployment among computer scientists.  
As demonstrated by these quotations, local media has made explicit the ethnic 
group competition currently characterizing the Boston high-tech sector. The mainstream 
high-tech workers feel threatened by the foreign individuals who possess difficult-to-find 
skills. Nonetheless, the Indian entrepreneurs in this case study assured me that they had 
not become targets for the anger of native high-tech workers. On the other hand, the 
interviewees’ examples of the high-tech milieu’s hostility very much resembled what 
theory has called “the other side of embeddedness”. When asked specifically about being 
confronted with skepticism from the mainstream, an entrepreneur responded that it 
                                                 
18 www.masshigh-tech.com  
19 The visa programs are foreign worker programs that allow degreed professionals to engage in 
employment in the US in specialty occupations. 
20  for example Maria Schafer at Meta Group Inc quoted in The Boston Globe, November 3, 2003   
 86
occurred predominantly in the initial stages of developing a relationship. “For example, 
this guy just wanted to talk baseball instead of technology. We couldn’t connect.” Hence, 
the situation may reflect an instance where an established high-tech actor is incapable of 
developing trust with a ’neophyte’ who also possesses a different identity. In other words, 
it appears to be the unintended consequences of the nature of economic action the two 
entrepreneurs have been subject to. Furthermore, since the interviewees were well 
anchored in the region and possessed similar social backgrounds to the mainstream, it is 
likely that ethnicity produced diverging identities.  
Intriguingly, two different entrepreneurs in my case study puzzlingly claimed that 
the high-tech milieu was simultaneously hostile to minorities, but welcoming to Indians. 
One of them explained that “it’s actually an advantage to be Indian in comparison to 
other minority groups. Perhaps also in comparison to the mainstream. As an Indian you 
are just singled out as being skilled!” Another entrepreneur informed me that “it was 
probably more difficult (to be Indian in the high tech sector) ten years ago. Boston’s 
high-tech milieu is changing”. In accordance with the latter interviewee, I intepret the 
Indian entrepreneurs’ ambiguous experiences in the local high-tech milieu as an 
indication of the sector’s current stated transition. More specifically, it appears that the 
high-tech milieu is transforming from a conservative and white dominated arena to a 
more open-minded and pluralistic environment. The recent shift to software as a core 
industry in the Boston high-tech sector, may especially have worked in favour of the 
Indians, who are known for their expertise within the field. Nonetheless, the current 
inclusion of minorities in general may be supported by a statement by the executive 
director of TiE21. She claims that the most recent downturn has created a “sort of a 
comradery among the local entrepreneurs. They all dealt with the same problems, they 
were are all suffering. Therefore they felt comforted by each other.” Thus, while the 
historical downturns have worked against the inclusion of minorities, the most recent 
downturn may have had the very opposite effect.    
 From a personal interview with the executive director of TiE, I understood that 
TiE had played an important role in facilitating Indian entrepreneurs’ integration into the 
local high-tech sector. TiE started in the beginning of the 1990s with three Indian 
                                                 
21 Personal interview with the executive director of TiE 
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entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley. As they were waiting at the airport for an Indian 
government official visiting Silicon Valley, the three entrepreneurs began to discuss the 
problems they encountered when running their high-tech businesses. Surprisingly, they 
realized that they were struggling with the same obstacles but had nobody to share these 
with. As a result, they founded an Indus22 networking organization that would promote 
entrepreneurship and function as a mentoring organization for Indus high-tech 
entrepreneurs. A few years later, a TiE member with strong connections to the east coast 
initiated a second TiE chapter in the Boston region. The Boston office is modeled after 
the Silicon Valley chapter and is today the second largest out of 42 chapters around the 
world. Furthermore, there are three communities within TiE: general members, charter 
members and sponsors. While the general members are entrepreneurs, or prospective 
entrepreneurs that pay a small fee for membership, the charter members are outstanding 
entrepreneurs, selected by the charter board. The charter members contribute financially 
(at least $1000 per year) but also socially. For example, they function as mentors for the 
younger, more inexperienced entrepreneurs. The sponsors, on the other hand, consist 
solely of corporate donators. While the Indus community was the initial strength of TiE, 
the organization’s message is equally relevant to all entrepreneurs, whether they are of 
Indus origin or not. Moreover, to facilitate Indus entrepreneurs’ integration into the 
mainstream network, TiE is currently building relationships with other business forums 
through the “Alliance Partnership”. According to the executive director of TiE, the 
Alliance Partnership is an attempt to: 
 
team up with the other central networking organizations in the area. The most important 
ones have been MIT Enterprise Forum, Massachusetts Software Council, Massachusetts 
Biotech and Massachusetts High-Tech. We give entrepreneurs from these forums the 
chance to take part in networking events for the same price as our members. In return, 
they do the same for our members. Recently we have started a project where we 
broadcast events jointly. Today, around 15% of the entrepreneurs that turn up for our 
events are members from these other networking groups. However, our goal is to have a 
more even ratio. 
 
Thus, by organizing joint events with central business forums, TiE has established a 
neutral setting where high-tech entrepreneurs, irrespective of ethnicity, may build 
                                                 
22 The Indus region includes India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh 
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relationships to other actors in the area. Consequently, TiE now also stands for “Talent, 
Ideas and Enterprise”. 
TiE has further targeted another common problem among Indian entrepreneurs, 
namely that of gaining credibility among local bankers and venture capital firms. One of 
the entrepreneurs in my case study claimed that he had personally experienced the 
skepticism from financial actors. His experience is further supported by another 
entrepreneur who had “Indian friends who had not been taken seriously by bankers and 
businessmen.” Furthermore, an interviewee informed me that “most Indian entrepreneurs 
solve this problem by scrapping their own savings. Then they go to their family and 
friends.” However, TiE has recently set up a program, The TiE Venture Forum, where 
they link prospective entrepreneurs with the local financial world. The forum collects 
business plans from prospective high-tech entrepreneurs, reviews them and singles out 
the most promising. After improving them in collaboration with the entrepreneurs, the 
best business plans are presented at an event where local bankers and venture capital 
firms are present. “A couple of months ago, we had a guy who got $15 million from 
investors” revealed the executive director of TiE.            
      Finally, TiE has made it plausible for Indian high-tech entrepreneurs to locate one 
another within a white dominated context. Thus, in contrast to my expectations, the under 
representation of Indians in the high-tech sector has not been a major obstacle for Indian 
entrepreneurs in this case study to interact with other Indian entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, 
the Indian interviewees deliberately sought out mainstream, non-Indian ties in the local 
environment in order to function effectively. As a result, they must manage to overcome 
the barriers directly related to diverging identities, or what I previously have called ‘the 
unintended consequences of the nature of economic actions’. In fact, the interviewees 
demonstrated a remarkable inventiveness and ingeniousness when striving to develop ties 
to local cross-ethnic actors. The field data revealed that the entrepreneurs made use of 
individual approaches in their attempts to socially integrate into the local high-tech 
milieu. I have singled out seven main courses of action. First, entrepreneurs made an 
effort to adopt those aspects of the dominant culture necessary to establish trust in a 
cross-ethnic relationship. Accordingly, they strived to develop expertise in shifting 
between different business cultures, namely their own ethnic milieu and the larger space 
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of the mainstream. Schnell and Sofer (2003 p. 305) have labeled this approach “Janus 
face” after a two faced Roman god. Naturally, the entrepreneurs’ ability to relate to 
cultural codes of the mainstream’s business milieu varied. The entrepreneur, who was 
most successful in his endeavors had been “exposed to American values already in 
childhood” by attending an American school in his native country. Secondly, 
entrepreneurs strived to focus attention away from ethnicity to alternative interpersonal 
similarities. For example, one entrepreneur explained that “these (cross-ethnic) contacts 
are representatives of rather small firms like my own. Therefore, it has been easier to 
develop close relationships”. In this instance, the interviewee had overcome ethnicity by 
focusing on the shared experience of managing a small firm. A third approach consisted 
of taking advantage of contacts from a prior working experience. Interviewees were 
typically able to transfer the connections that their previous employer maintained to their 
own start-up. Benefiting from their cross-ethnic personnels’ channels of information and 
cooperation was a fourth common method. By employing computer engineers and 
business administrators with extensive experience in the local high-tech sector, the Indian 
entrepreneurs ensured to enhance their own personal role-set with their employees. For 
example, one entrepreneur revealed that his firm had “just employed a new marketing 
person. He has 20 years of experience within the field and is remarkably well-
connected.” A fifth approach involved overcoming ethnic barriers by establishing 
credibility among local high-tech actors. The interviewees believed that they had to 
surpass other firms’ accomplishments in order to achieve trustworthiness. An interviewee 
informed me that “the Boston high-tech network is such a small community. Your 
reputation will spread quickly. As long as you prove that you are reliable and 
competitive, you are fine.” A sixth course of action, involved participating in one of the 
local business forums where a shared vision of profit and growth is gradually 
transcending ethnicity. For example, during workshops high-tech actors would bond over 
the common effort of solving technical and financial obstacles encountered in the daily 
operation of their firms. Finally, an inventive approach that was adopted in order to form 
contacts with mainstream central firms was to take advantage of connections to co-ethnic 
employees in the lower echelons of these corporations. In this instance, the Indian 
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entrepreneurs have had to compromise the benefit of having high-status personal 
contacts, with that of being connected to critical firms in the Boston high-tech sector. 
The inventive approaches employed to integrate into the mainstream was an 
attempt to grasp opportunities and talent in the regional environment. Yet, this ambition 
was not equivalent to abandoning their co-ethnic relations. Cross-ethnic ties were 
skillfully balanced with co-ethnic relations. As mentioned in a previous section, co-ethnic 
ties were not only technologically instrumental but had an emotional and supportive 
dimension that most of the cross-ethnic relations lacked. As a result, the interviewees 
deliberately maintained two social circles of ties: the co-ethnic and the cross ethnic. They 
were, thus, able to function efffectivly in a white dominated context as well as reaping 
the benefits of psychosocial support from their own ethnic community. As illustrated by 
figure ten, the ratio between co-ethnic and cross-ethnic connections varied. The 
interviewee who was most dependent on co-ethnic ties had a 50/50 ratio. Accordingly, 
the usage of local cross-race connections was partial and non-emotional.                
 
Figure 10. Models of the ratio between White and Indian local connections among the 
Indian entrepreneurs in this case study 
 
The Indian entrepreneurs in computer related industries specifically benefited from 
the regional environment in regards to sales and marketing and the R&D process. 
However, The interviewees also took advantage of external relations. None of the 
interviewees were entirely dependant on the local milieu. As mentioned in a previous 
section, the entrepreneurs were convinced that external ties were particularly significant 
for informative purposes. The geographical location of informative connections was 
totally dependant on the interviewees’ individual backgrounds. In other words, they were 
spread irregularly over national and global space. In contrast, the final stage of the 
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innovative process typically took place in a development center in one of the high-tech 
agglomerations in India. One entrepreneur claimed that “everybody has to do some kind 
of offshoring to survive”. Interviewees believed that transnational connections to India 
were specifically important from an R&D perspective. When asked specifically about 
relations to a development center in Bangalore, one entrepreneur explained that: 
 
It’s an R&D company. Basically, it’s like our daughter company. We are the financers 
and we communicate daily with them. This guy that I have called (A) travels back and 
fourth between Bangalore and Boston. We do the technical development over there. 
People are very skilled and salaries are low. It’s a huge advantage for us. I meet with 
my clients in Boston and we discuss an appropriate solution for their GIS development. 
Then I explain the situation for (A) and he has got a team of Indians in Bangalore who 
will take care of the technical side of it. Personally, I also travel to India frequently to 
check on the guys.  
 
In a similar way, another entrepreneur claimed that “with the industry’s best off-shore 
facilities and infrastructure, we provide the most reliable software development 
environment to our clients. Our approach, offshore facilities and time-zone advantage 
enable us to offer unique development and support services.” However, working around 
the clock and employing India’s skilled and cheap computer scientists in the R&D 
process, have not been an initial function of the interviewees firm. Interviewees explained 
that it had developed gradually as an important competitive advantage. In fact, two of the 
interviewees had not yet implemented their plans to outsource parts of the R&D process. 
One of these entrepreneur explained that he wished to expand nationally before 
attempting to offshore R&D activities. The other interviewee claimed that data security, 
his firms specialization, had not been an issue in India yet. Therefore, it was severly 
difficult to find skilled computer scientist within this field in India. Accordingly, these 
two entrepreneurs were still dependant on local in-house facilities.  
Based on the field data I was able to single out two dominant social tie models 
that capture the most important spatial features of the interviewees’ role-sets. The first 
one, exemplified by figure eleven, is a national delivery model, where external ties from 
national high-tech centers supplement local connections. What specifically characterizes 
this business model is the fact that all the stages of innovative activity occur within the 
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local industrial district. Accordingly, the model represents the Indian entrepreneurs who 
lack transnational ties to India or to other global high-tech centers.  
    
 
Figure 11. The national model of the spatial aspects of an entrepreneur’s connections 
 
In equivalence to the national model, the global delivery model cements the 
importance of regional connections. The entrepreneurs conforming to the global delivery 
model, however, have transcended national borders and are profiting from overseas 
expertise and cost-savings. More specifically, by maintaining complementary 
connections to their country of origin the interviewees have managed to outsource the 
very costly stage of the innovative process. While both of the business models secure the 
Indian entrepreneurs from stagnating processes, such as ‘groupthink’, only the second 
delivery model, examplified by figure twelve, constitutes a significant financial benefit. 
Accordingly, the entrepreneurs employing the global tie-model have turned their 
ethnicity into a competitive advantage.  
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Figure 12. The global model of the spatial aspects of an entrepreneur’s connections 
 
Intriguingly, the interviewees who had implemented the global delivery model 
were surprisingly secretive about their approach. Only when asked explicitly would they 
elaborate on their ties to a development center in India. The particular discretion 
regarding outsourcing activities may be a consequence of the strong reactions from local 
high-tech workers. Outsourcing coincided and may have contributed to the recession in 
the early 2000s in the Boston region. One entrepreneur explained that “a while ago it 
(outsourcing) was the topic of the day. Now it has become a political issue.” In fact, 
Indian professionals say that the outsourcing backlash is felt most in Boston. “Firms are 
employing locals as project/team leaders so that the team is in a better position to handle 
the situation in case of an uproar.”23 Yet, the use of computer scientists in India by 
Boston based Indian entrepreneurs is only likely to grow. Today, local Indian 
entrepreneurs are not the only group using outsourcing as a competitive advantage. Close 
                                                 
23 India Business Insight, March 2, 2004 
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to 200 of the Fortune 500 companies carry out parts of their R&D process in India24. 
“Outsourcing is in full bloom” in the words of the executive director of TiE.  
Despite the cost-savings related to the global delivery model, figure twelve plainly 
demonstrates that connections to India have not replaced the importance of local ties. The 
interviewees made clear that local and external contacts fulfill different purposes. For 
example, one entrepreneur informed me that “ they (connections to India) are crucial to 
us for technological reasons. However, we can’t survive without our connections to 
clients here in Boston.” Moreover, in contrast to my expectations, it did not seem to be 
the exclusionary pressures of the local milieu that had spurred the Indian entrepreneurs to 
take advantage of transnational connections to their country of origin. Due to the 
transitional status of the Boston high-tech milieu, the interviewees had not been 
confronted with the degree of skepticism that I had anticipated. Furthermore, since local 
and external ties complement each other, external contacts can never compensate for a 
lack of regional anchoring. Instead, objectives such as growth and profit drove the Indian 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of technology experts in India. The interviewees already 
had the language and the culture to function effectively in an Indian high-tech 
environment. In fact, during one of the workshops at TiE, Indian entrepreneurs revealed 
their plans of expanding outsourcing activities to other areas of their firm, for competitive 
reasons. For example, huge cost-savings are plausible in the process of marketing and 
selling products. While the Indian entrepreneurs who were present at the workshop 
agreed on that sales and marketing will always partially involve a face-to-face 
relationships, they acknolwedged the possibility of initiating certain stages of the process 
offshore. Perhaps, this will be my interviewees’ next inventive course of action to remain 
at the competitive edge.  
 
The Impact of Technology 
When analyzing the impact of technology, it is important to bear in mind that technology 
is affected at the most profound level by the society in which it is produced. More 
specifically, technology will always be surrounded by social, economical and cultural 
circumstances that condition its creation, outcome and use. I distant myself from theories 
                                                 
24 www.masshightech.com June 9, 2003 
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that claim technology is an external, autonomous force that excerts an unprecedented 
influence on the social world. In contrast, I argue that technology and society are 
inextricably bound together and the traffic between the two is reciprocal. Since 
technology is a socio-technical product, the very social factors that shape technology also 
have an impact on the social implications of technology. Having said this, I am now in a 
position to analyse how technology, embedded in a particular social system, has 
influenced the connections that Indian entrepreneurs make use of.  
The field data revealed that the role-sets of Indian entrepreneurs from 
technologies such as engineering and architectural services differed drastically from their 
counterparts’ connections in computer-based technologies. This was true despite the fact 
that the interviewees had remarkably similar backgrounds. In other words, the individual 
experiences of the entrepreneurs were not sufficient to explain the diverging usage of 
connections among entrepreneurs from dissimilar technologies. However, the functional, 
socio-cultural and institutional/legal conditions of the different technological systems 
(techno-system) were instrumental in explaining the characteristics of the entrepreneurs’ 
ties. For example, in regards to the functional conditions, the factor inputs needed to run a 
business (i.e. labor, knowledge, materials and components) varied greatly between 
IT/software, architecture and engineering technologies. Consequently, only the software 
and IT entrepreneurs acknowledged and confirmed the particular network structure 
outlined in chapter three. The architecture and engineering entrepreneurs who where 
dependant on disparate factor inputs were alien to such an organizational setting. 
Furthermore, interviewees from separate technologies were not confronted with the same 
obstacles to solve affecting the type of relations required, and the geography of these 
relationships. With concern to the socio-cultural conditions, the degree of discrimination 
and the social conservatism of the technological communities had a significant impact on 
the ethnicity of the connections that the entrepreneurs had formed. Finally, institutional 
and legal conditions of the techno-system such as government regulations partially 
shaped the spatial aspects of the interviewees role-set. As a result, entrepreneurs from 
different sub-technologies have to be analyzed individually. Several entrepreneurs from 
non-computer industries were, unfortunately, not willing to take part in my study. They 
argued that “the questionnaire is not relevant to my business model”. However, three 
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entrepreneurs from the engineering and architectural fields agreed to assist me in 
developing a more thorough understanding of their specific social tie-model.  
An Indian entrepreneur who I will call Mr Patel, had specilized within energy 
engineering technologies. By immigrating immidietly after the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act of 1965, pursuing his graduate degree at Harvard University and 
spending 14 years working at a local high-tech firm, Mr Patel displayed similar 
background characteristics as his Indian counterparts. Nonetheless, Mr Patel’s role-set 
was fundamentaly different from the Indian computer entrepreneurs. The interviewee was 
not only detached from the local high-tech milieu, but he also revealed a comprehensive 
independance from geographical space. In contrast to the business model of his fellow 
Indian entrepreneurs, Mr Patel’s delivery model was unique, vast and complex in nature. 
As demonstrated by figure thirteen, the unique aspect of his model was the fact that Mr 
Patel did not base the operations of his firm solely on his own connections. On the other 
hand, he explained that he took advantage of the role-sets of a team of key employees 
with international expertice within the energy field. Mr Patel employed the global arena 
as his recruitment base to secure that his key staff included the most qualified experts in 
the industry. Moreover, he had ensured that his key staff individually mastered at least 
two languages in order to function effectively in his globally-oriented firm. Mr Patel also 
revealed that he required his team of key-employees to have prior experience in working 
with foreign governments and multilateral donor agencies. As a result, he had secured an 
excepetionally well connected core of key employees. One of his team members was: 
 
a former employee of Price Waterhouse Coopers and the World Bank. Mr (A) served as 
a Principal Consultant at PWC and Senior Power Engineering for the Energy Division 
at the World Bank. Mr (A) has worked throughout the world on electricity sector 
restructuring with focus on restructuring and privatization. He has more than 35 years 
of energy industry experience with energy research institutes, universities, national and 
international organizations (International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna and CNEN, 
Italy), the power industry, international financial institutions (The World Bank) and 
consulting organizations. He has extensive emerging energy market experience and has 
worked in such diverse countries as Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Yugoslavia, 
Ukraine, Turkey, Italy, Germany, Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, and the USA. He is proficient in Serbo-Croatian languages, Russian, Italian 
and French. He also has a Master of Science in Power, Nuclear Engineering, University 
of Belgrad, Bachelors, Power Engineering, University of Belgrad.            
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The core of key individuals in Mr Patels firm further functioned as his source of 
psychosocial support. Thus, in contrast to the Indian computer entrepreneus in this case 
study, Mr Patel had no supportive connections beyond the boundaries of his firm. When 
adding up the role-sets of Mr Patels’ core employees, the entrepreneur had an enormous 
amount of critical connections at his disposal. Thus, while figure thirteen is an attempt to 
illustrate the characteristics of Mr Patels delivery model, it cannot not do justice to the 
variety and scope of connections that the interviewee and his team of key collegues 
maintained.  
 
 
Figure 13. The Indian entrepreneneur’s delivery model from the energy-engineering field 
 
Another fundamental difference between my interview from the energy-engineering field 
and the computer-based entrepreneurs was Mr Patel’s variety of sources of contacts. In 
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other words, Mr Patel informed me that he not only made use of connections to other 
firms, but also upheld ties to universities, multilateral donnor agenices, independant 
consultants, foreign governments and labs. While the regional high-tech milieu was 
critical to the Indian computer entrepreneurs, the environment was only signgificant to 
Mr Patel in the sense that he took advantage of “a variety of top-talent” in the engineering 
departments and labs of local universities. Interestingly, the charter members of TiE had 
selected Mr Patel to become a lifelong charter member, which is the most honorable 
membership and only offered to particularily successful, local entrepreneurs. However, 
Mr Patel confirmed the insignificance of the high-tech mileu by stressing that “they (TiE) 
are IT guys. I used to be involved with them and go to their meetings but it was not 
relevant for me. They are in a very different technology than I am.” Furthermore, since 
experts from national and international education and research institutions were equally 
important to Mr Patels firm, locality did not play a particularly prominent role. However, 
ties to local, national and international universities and labs were crucial for both 
informative and R&D purposes. For example, in regards to the R&D process, innovation 
took place in two complimentory stages. First, innovation occured in collaboration with 
selected univeristies and labs and second, within the R&D department of the firm.     
In contrast to the IT and software entrepreneurs in this case study, Mr Patel 
explained to me that the only beyond firm connections that were important for the 
competitiveness of his firm were ties to clients and informative/R&D relations. 
Furthermore, while a fraction of the informative/R&D contacts were localy based, 
connections to clients where entirely sought out on a global scale. Mr Patel’s firm had 
worked on energy engineering projects in over 30 different countries, mostly in the 
developing world. As a result of the focus on developping countries, not only did foreign 
governments function as the primary clientele base, but Mr Patel also worked on 
commissions by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, such as USAID, UN, EBRD 
(The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the World Bank. 
Furthermore, many of his clients were important information sources. The ‘grey’ 
connections to the donor agencies as well as to firms and selected foreign governments in 
figure thirteen, indicates a less strong relationship only at use on an irregular basis. In 
other words, these were employed according to need or on a project-to-project basis. In 
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contrast to the Indian computer entrepreneurs, Mr Patel and his core team managed to 
more evenly balance strong connections with a weak set of ties.  
 Mr Patel further explained that global connections to firms were utilized to 
retrieve local knowledge about the energy sector in the countries that his firm were 
working in. “We also maintain a Partnership of senior and mid-level independant 
consultants” for similar purposes, he revealed.  
While the computer entrepreneurs in this case study maintained transnational 
connections to their country of origin, Mr Patel clarified that due to the specific 
technologies at use in his firm he was unable to take advantage of India’s booming high-
tech industry. In fact, he did maintain connections to the Indian government as a result of 
a prior environmental project that his firm had accomplished in the country. However, 
these connections were not more important than the 29 other governmental relations his 
key employees maintained worldwide. When asked specifically about the ethnicity of his 
connections, Mr Patel informed me that “they are all Caucasian” (white). Moreover, he 
added, “I can’t look for ethnicity when I develop connections, I only look for talent.” 
Accordingly, the knowledge intensity of Mr Patels’ firm spurred him to seek out 
connections to energy experts and clients on a global scale. 
 The second set of entrepreneurs who diverged from the Indians from the 
IT/software technology were two entrepreneurs specializing in architectural services. 
These interviewees were post-1965, student-turned immigrants with over a decade of 
working experience with local high-tech firms. Coincidentially, they both ran firms with 
only four employees. The two architectural entrepreneurs used a much less complex 
social tie model than the Indian entrepreneurs from computer and engineering 
technologies. In fact, most activities occured in-house and not in collaboration with actors 
from a technological milieu. For example, the interviewees briefed me that only 
informative ties were significant for the day-to-day operation of their firms. The 
entrepreneurs actively sought out four different types of information: information on 
emerging technologies, information on regulatory issues, information on the state-of-the-
art of their architectural specilization field and information on prospective clients. 
Information regarding the three first issues was not only important for functioning 
competently as an architect, but also crucial for developping trust to a prospective client. 
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One of the entrepreneurs explained that “success lies in the professional, business and 
personal relationship between owner and architect.” Because of the intense cooperation 
between the owner and the architectural firm, the chemistry has to be perfectly right. 
More importantly, the architectural firm is expected to provide the prospective client with 
information about such diverse factors as site-use, environmental regulations, planning 
and zoning appplications, energy costs, drawings, models and presentations.  
Based on the field data, I found that information on clients might be obtained 
through four different approches. In most cases, the client actually seeks out the 
architectural firm and assigns the project only after in-depth interviews. However, one of 
the interviewees revealed that thoughtful architects are as careful in selecting their clients 
as owners are. Owners may award an architectural firm a project by selecting from a 
database of architects that most architectural organisations maintain. Alternatively, they 
may choose by reputation, or what one of the entrepreneurs called “word of mouth”. 
Once you have successfully designed a facility, your reputation will spread through the 
elite community, explained the entrepreneur. Furthermore, architects may more actively 
seek out prospective clients by consulting previous colleagues and other firms in the 
industry. Finally, the entrepreneurs may enter architectural competitions often held in 
collaboration between an architectural organization and an owner.         
As may be illustrated by figure fourteen, the two Indian entrepreneurs, 
intruigingly, consulted diverging sources to retrieve the necessary type of information. 
By utilising connections to other architectural firms, former colleagues and business 
forums, entrepreneur B’s role-set resembles the inter-firm model adapted by the 
IT/software entrepereneurs discussed earlier. In contrast, entrepreneur A employed a 
much more institutionally oriented role-set. For example, architectural organizations such 
as the Boston Architectural Center provided this interviewee with information and tools 
necessary to create a competitve advantage in the market. They not only offered monthly 
lectures and briefings on design issues relevant to his specilization, but also critical 
information on changes that affect building and public spaces. For example, entrepreneur 
A would take advantage of the specilized business forums and knowledge communities 
where architectural firms would collaborate to deepen their understanding of a certain 
topic. On an irregular basis, he would also participate in conferences and trade-shows 
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organised by Bostons’ Architectural Center. Entrepreneur A who had graduated from 
MIT had further managed to maintain significant informative ties to his former 
educational institution. Through the years, however, he was able to foster ties to other 
relevant universities in the Boston area, such as Northeastern University, Boston 
Architectural Center and Wentworth Institute of Technology. The reason behind why the 
entrepreneurs had chosen to retrieve information from such diverging sources as 
institutions versus firms was not completely clear to me. Since entrepreneur A had set up 
his firm more than 10 years earlier than entrepreneur B, the diverging informative sources 
may simply have been a consequense of fluctuating trends within the architectural milieu. 
However, it is also plausible that personal preference played a determining role. 
Further illustrated by figure fourteen is the fact that interviewees from 
architectural services only made use of informative contacts from the local and the 
extended local environment. The total lack of national or transnational connections 
demonstrates that the architectural interviewees are much more spatially dependant than 
the previous interviewees in this case study. The importance of local connections have 
not, however, translated into a concrete architectural agglomeration. In contrast, firms are 
widely spread in the local environment. The nature of the US architectural industry that 
forces architectural firms to go through demanding registration procedures in all the 
states they choose to operate in, is partly responsible for the architectures’ spatial 
limitations. 
Interestingly, the ethnic composition of the architectural community was almost 
identical to the aggregated high-tech milieu. While 94% consisted of white actors, 3% 
were Asians, 1% African American and 2% Latino25. Both of the Indian entrepreneurs in 
architectural services were striving to become part of the mainstream architectural milieu. 
While entrepreneur B claimed to have experienced a smooth integration into the local 
architectural network, entrepreneur A had found the process severly complicated. In 
entrepreneur A’s words:  
 
I am a foreigner, you know. It’s difficult to break into the mainstream, but necessary. 
Most business goes by word of mouth.   
 
                                                 
25 www.architects.org 
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Figure 14. The social tie-model of the two Indian entrepreneurs from architectural 
services. 
 
In fact, the National organization of Minority Architects (NOMA) has fought against 
discrimination of minorities within the architectural field since 1971. Nonetheless, the 
former president of NOMA26 admits that it may not only be the exclusionary pressure  
from the majority that prevents minorities from participating in the design profession, but 
also their preference for similar others: 
 
Architecture and architects are an integral part of the culture of the elite in our society. 
That elite is overwhelmingly white and male. Those who might consider becoming an 
architect must invaribly come into contact with this cultural phenomenon. Human 
nature renders us wary of individuals who belong to a group other than our own. A lack 
of women and ethnic minorities in architecture leads us to a lack of women and ethnic 
minority architects. 
 
When taking into account entrepreneur A’s limited knowledge of the English language, it 
is uncertain whether entrepreneur A has been subject to exclusionary pressure, or if his 
                                                 
26 www.architects.org 
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difficulties to ”break into the mainstream” is simply a result of his own personal inability 
to relate to the cultural codes of the mainstream. Nevertheless, and equivalent to the 
computer entrepreneurs, the Indian entrepreneurs from architectural services regarded the 
integration into the mainstream as a must for fulfilling their ambitions of growth and 
profit. In contrast to the interviewees from IT/software technologies the architectural 
interviewees not only took advantage of white and Indian connnections, but they also 
profited from ties to other Asian minorities. Entrepreneur A had a ratio of 50/30/20 
between ties to whites, Indians and other Asian minorities. In contrast, interviewee B 
claimed to have a role-set consisting of 80% white connections while the remaining 20% 
were divided between Indian and other Asian. Furthermore, while all the entrepreneurs’ 
contacts, irrespective of ethnicity, were characterized by “trust”, only the Indian 
connections would provide the sort of psychosocial support, common between actors 
with similar interpersonal identities. Finally, diversity of ties was not a priority between 
the two entrepreneurs in architectural services. 
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Chapter 7 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Summarizing the Nature and the Type of the Connections at use 
I opened this thesis by stating my intentions to explore the type and the nature of the 
social ties that Asian Indian entrepreneurs have formed, and are making use of, in the 
daily operations of their firm. I claimed that the research on Indian entrepreneurs’ 
connections would enable me to fulfill my objective; namely that of determining the 
social tie-strategies that ethnic entrepreneurs from a knowledge intensive sector pursue. 
Significantly, it would allow me to ascertain whether the social tie-strategies of the 
knowledge intensive, ethnic entrepreneurs in this study differ from the social tie-
strategies that traditional ethnic entrepreneurs have employed. I constructed four research 
questions, one main question and three subquesitons, that would function as tools for 
analyzing the social ties of the Indian entrepreneurs. They read as following: 
 
1) What kind of ties have Indian entrepreneurs adopted in order to stay competitive in 
Boston’s high-tech sector? 
a) Have Indian entrepreneurs managed to integrate a) spatially and b) socially into the 
local, established high-tech network? 
b) Have Indian entrepreneurs developed complementory transnational ties to actors in 
India’s high-tech regions? If yes, can these transnational ties compensate for anticipated 
exclusionary pressures in the local, established Boston high-tech network?      
c) Have Indian entrepreneurs in this case study adapted their set of connections to the 
type of technology at use in their firm? 
 
I specifically pointed out the importance of taking the particularities of the opportunity 
structure into consideration when analyzing the social ties that ethnic entrepreneurs 
utilize in the day-to-day operation of their firms. The opportunity structure was defined as 
the economic, technological, socio-economic and socio-ethnic structures of a specific 
context which produces a set of possible courses of action. While chapter three identified 
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important features of the opportunity structure of Boston’s high-tech sector, chapter four 
provided an in-depth, theoretical discussion on selected underlying processes in the 
environment. The critical features of the opportunity structure that I discussed were the 
ethnic composition of the high-tech sector, the domination by the white, male elite 
plausibly resulting in exclusionary pressures such as the unintended and intended 
consequences of economic action, the shift to software as a core industry and the network 
form of organization that makes social ties key for a high-tech entrepreneur aiming to 
stay at the competitive edge. However, I specified that the context might only influence 
and not determine the actions of ethnic entrepreneurs. Indian entrepreneurs play an active 
role in shaping the type of connections at use. When analyzing the field data I combined 
the insights from inter-organizational and social network theory.  
 To start with subquestion c, the field data revealed that the functional, socio-
cultural and institutional/legal conditions of the different technological systems 
influenced fundamental aspects of the entrepreneurs’ role-sets. In other words, Indian 
entrepreneurs from architecture and engineering services had adopted drastically different 
social relations than their counterparts specializing in IT/software. The architecture and 
engineering entrepreneurs belonged to dissimilar high-tech communities that functioned 
on a disparate logic than the milieu of the computer-based entrepreneurs. These findings 
not only undermind parts of the theoretical framework of the thesis but also resulted in 
the need to analyse the entrepreneurs from contrasting sub technologies separately. 
Accordingly, the answers to questions 1, a, and b must be threefold. It is important to 
point out that when I analyzed the impact of technology on the entrepreneurs’ role-sets, I 
recognized that technology is always surrounded by social, economical and cultural 
circumstances that condition its creation, outcome and use. Accordingly, I distanced 
myself from theories that adopt a technologically determinist stance. 
 Continuing with subquestion a, the computer based entrepreneurs viewed their 
perfect spatial integration into the high-tech agglomerations in Cambridge and along 
routes 128, 495 and 93 as a practical and symbolical necessity for socially integrating 
into the high-tech industrial district. The computer entrepreneurs’ social integration was 
influenced by specific features in the context. Moreover, factors that would have 
restrained the IT/software entrepreneurs natural integration into the local high-tech 
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network, such as the ethnic composition of the sector and the particular power structure 
of the high-tech community, had been counterbalanced by circumstances of the context 
that have worked in favour of the Indian entrepreneurs. The shift to software as a core 
industry, the transitional status of the sector, the recent downturn and the impact of ethnic 
business forums had facilitated the computer based entrepreneurs integration. The 
IT/software entrepreneurs believed that integrating into the local, mainstream network 
was vital for functioning effectively in a white dominated context and had used their 
individual experiences to pursue their goal. Nonetheless, the computer based 
entrepereneurs’ integration must be considered partial. The entrepreneur from the energy 
engineering field, specializing in a very different technology, did not view the local high-
tech network as relevant for him. Accordingly, he was not affected by the particularities 
of the context. With help from his team of key employees, however, he had managed to 
socially integrate into the international mainstream energy community. The two 
entrepreneurs from architectural services were confronted by a high-tech community 
similar in characteristics, but distinct from the computer based entrepreneurs. The lack of 
an agglomeration of architectural firms made spatial integration irrelevant. However, the 
social integration into the extended local architectural community was regarded as a must 
in order to stay at the competitive edge. Despite constraints in the environment, such as 
exclusionary pressures, both of the entrepreneurs had managed to become part of the 
local architectural network.                     
        With concern to subquestion b, a majority of the computer based entrepreneurs 
had developed complementory ties to high-tech actors in India. Connections to high-tech 
centers in India were most important for the R&D process. Being able to work around the 
clock and utilize cheap computer scientists made ties to India a financial benefit and a 
competitive advantage for the Indian entrepreneurs. Yet, two IT/software entrepreneurs 
had not yet implemented their plans of outsourcing parts of their R&D activities. The 
relationships to Indian high-tech centers did not seem to be a result of the exclusionary 
pressures in the Boston high-tech community but rather another attempt to achieve their 
goals of growth and profit. Due to their technological specialization, the entrepreneurs 
from engineering and architectural services were not able to benefit from ties to software 
developers and computer scientists in India. The engineering entrepreneur did have 
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transnational connections to the Indian government but these ties had a subordinate 
function in the entrepreneur’s role-set. 
 Although I have already given a few answers to the main question, namely what 
kind of ties Indian entrepreneurs have adopted to stay competitive, I will here present 
some additional findings that have not been covered by my subquestions. Again, the 
answer must be threefold. The computer entrepreneurs mainly made use of firm-to-firm 
relations in the locality complemented by a few national or global connections to other 
firms. Socially, spatially and ethnically diverse informative connections were specifically 
important to grasp new opportunities in the market. Moreover, the attempt to integrate 
into the mainstream, local network did not mean that they had abandoned their co-ethnic 
ties. Instead, the computer entrepreneurs supplemented connections to mainstream actors 
with supportive ties to local, co-ethnic experts who were singled out, among other ways, 
through ethnic business forums. The interviewee from engineering services profited from 
the role-sets of a team of international experts within the energy field who also 
functioned as his source of psychosocial support. In contrast to the computer based 
entrepreneurs, the engineering entrepreneur did not only take advantage of firm-to-firm 
relations but also benefited from a diversified group of contacts. The interviewee could 
not afford to consider the ethnicity of his contacts but searched for ties to talented 
individuals on a global scale. According to the architects, regional informative 
connections were the sole prerequisite for staying abreast on a range of issues that 
fundamentally determined their success in obtaining clients and functioning effectively in 
the architectural field. Both of the architectural interviewees had diversified their 
informative sources. However, while institutions dominated one of the entrepreneurs’ 
role-sets, firm-to-firm relations were more important for the second entrepreneur. The 
architectural entrepreneurs further managed to skillfully balance white, Indian and Asian 
contacts but solely gained support from their co-ethnic ties. 
 Despite the fact that the nine entrepreneurs specialized in three different sets of 
technologies the field data revealed that one tie-attribute was universal. All the 
interviewees benefited from a stable set of strong connections, only supplemented by 
weaker ties that were used on a more irregular basis. Due to the comparable knowledge 
intensity of the IT/software, architecture and engineering industries, strength was the 
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governing mechanism of the entrepreneurs’ connections enabling the transfer of complex 
and fine-grained information. However, it is important to point out that the strength of the 
relations must be viewed in the light of the industrial district framework. 
 What is specifically interesting about these nine ethnic entrepreneurs from 
knowledge intensive industries is the fact that all of them were operating smaller 
companies. Notwithstanding that the entrepreneurs drastically diverged on the type and 
the characteristics of the social ties they had adopted, they shared a strong awareness of 
the importance of connections for staying competitive. The interviewees also 
demonstrated a goal-oriented and rational approach when fostering relationships. Because 
of the adaption of the network form of organization the entrepreneurs were managing to 
function effectively in a globalized, regionalized and flexible economy. This is evidence 
that small firms can be strong and dynamic entities, capable of adapting to market 
conditions. It further demonstrates that ethnic entrepreneurs have commenced the process 
of breaking out from spatially and sectorally marginalized arenas and some of them, like 
my interviewees, are now successfully competing with the mainstream in the most 
sophisticated sectors of the economy. 
 
A Return to the Objective of the Thesis 
Having summarized the type and the characteristics of the connections that nine Indian 
entrepreneurs in the Boston high-tech sector make use of, I am now in a position to 
determine the social tie-strategies ethnic entrepreneurs in a knowledge intensive sector 
may adopt to stay competitive. As I have thoroughly illustrated, there is no uniform 
answer to the type of connections the Indian entrepreneurs in this case study employ. On 
the one hand, the entrepreneurs’ individual experiences engendered a slightly nuanced 
representation of the connections at use within comparable sub industries. On the other 
hand, entrepreneurs had adapted their role-sets to the technological specialization of their 
firm. As a result, interviewees from computer industries, engineering and architectural 
services diverged on the very detailed attributes of their ties, as well as on the spatial and 
ethnic features of their entire role-sets. Accordingly, the conclusion regarding the pattern 
describing how the entrepreneurs position themselves to others in order to accomplish 
their goals must be divided. The following social-tie strategies have become apparent.  
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First, while traditional ethnic entrepreneurs’ connections tend to be homogenous, 
the nine Indian entrepreneurs adopted the strategy of forming connections to a diversified 
set of actors. The strategy was particularly evident in the informative ties of the 
IT/software entrepreneurs. The interviewees maintained relations to socially, ethnically 
and spatially diverse actors in order to secure a consistent flow of information on new 
opportunities in the market. The engineering and architectural entrepreneurs had 
diversified their sources of contacts in a slightly different manner. They benfited from 
ties to a range of actors such as firms, universities, former colleagues, labs, foreign 
governments, donor agencies and architectural organizations.  
Second, interviewees from all technological specializations employed the tie-
strategy of breaking into the networks of the mainstream. In contrast to ethnic 
entrepreneurs in low-skilled sectors, the nine Indian entrepreneurs have moved away 
from an over reliance on ethnic communal resources towards increasing use of 
mainstream actors, institutions and markets. However, I observed differences in regards 
to how, and to what degree, Indian entrepreneurs had integrated into their respective 
mainstream networks. I was further able to detect variations in the openness of the 
various high-tech communities. The effort of the computer based entrepreneurs to break 
into the network of the mainstream was less strenuous than the attempt of one of the 
architectural entrepreneurs, due to significant changes in the structure of the IT/software 
community. In other words, the opportunity structure had recently advanced decisively in 
favour of the computer entrepreneurs, facilitating their integration.     
Third, while the traditional image of ethnic entrepreneurs is the ethnic enclave 
with limited ties to the outside economy, the Indian engineering and computer 
entrepreneurs had adopted an external social tie-strategy. The interviewees took 
advantage of numerous connections on a national or global scale. Indian entrepreneurs 
from the IT and software industries were specifically reaping the benefits from 
transnational ties to skilled computer scientists in India. The nature of the architectural 
industry, on the other hand, restricted the two architectural entrepreneurs to the local 
extended environment. 
Fourth, the Indian architecture and computer entrepreneurs adhered to the 
traditional approach among ethnic entrepreneurs, and supplemented the diversifying, 
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integrational and external tie-strategies with ethnic strategies. In contrast to their 
counterparts in low skilled sectors, they managed to skillfully balance the co-ethnic 
connections with integration into the mainstream. As a result, they had not been subject 
to the insularity and segregation that many traditional ethnic entrepreneurs have 
experienced. Due to the greater comfort they felt in being with other Indians, they 
benefited from psychosocial support from their local ethnic community. Despite the 
under representation of Indian entrepreneurs in IT and software, the interviewees 
specializing in these technologies were able to seek out local co-ethnic experts through 
ethnic business forums. 
Hence, the nine Indian entrepreneurs from knowledge intensive industries within 
the Boston high-tech sector are gradually moving away from the distinctiveness that 
traditionally characterized ethnic entrepreneurship. What specifically distinguished these 
Indian entrepreneurs from traditional ethnic entrepreneurs is the diversification of their 
social tie-strategies, their extroverted behavior and their advancement towards integration 
into the networks of the mainstream. The traditional ethnic entrepreneur has been 
perceived as having little interest in mainstream social life, consumerism and self-
expression. The ethnic entrepreneur has further been depicted as being content with 
tolerable survival. However, the nine Indian entrepreneurs from the Boston high-tech 
sector are driven by goals such as growth and profit. In fact, the entrepreneurs in this 
study included some of the regions most successful and fast-growing companies. Not 
only was the launching process and the day-to-day operation characterized by innovative 
activity, but every aspect of the Indian entrepreneurs’ courses of action reflects a 
remarkable level of inventiveness and ingeniousness.  
By exploring the connections of Indian entrepreneurs who have escaped spatially 
and marginalized arenas, I have expanded our understanding of the tie-strategies ethnic 
entrepreneurs may pursue. More importantly, by highlighting the specific tie-strategies of 
nine ethnic entrepreneurs from a knowledge intensive sector I have taken one step 
towards a less biased ethnic entrepreneur theory. The qualitative nature of this study, 
however, makes generalizations to whole populations of minorities unthinkable. 
Moreover, since strategies emerge from the interaction of opportunity structures and the 
purposeful action of actors, studies on the social-tie strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs 
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must be considered place-specific. Accordingly, there are still many issues deserving 
greater attention. I propose that the following steps be prioritized. First, more rigorous, 
quantitative, comparative data that takes the particularities of the opportunity context into 
consideration would enable scholars to determine whether there is a systematic difference 
in tie-strategies between ethnic entrepreneurs from knowledge intensive sectors and their 
counterparts from low-skilled arenas. For example, is integration into the networks of the 
mainstream a strategy specifically characterizing ethnic entrepreneurs in knowledge 
intensive sectors? Secondly, almost no studies have examined the relationship between 
social tie-strategies and the performance of the entrepreneur’s firm. Thus, we have no 
understanding of how the choice of strategies influences entrepreneurial success. Finally, 
since much of the research carried out on ethnic entrepreneurs is static, scholars know 
little about if, and how, ethnic entrepreneurs’ tie-strategies alter from the early stages of 
growth to the more mature phases of their firm. Therefore, I recommend more 
longitudinal and dynamic research designs in order to create a more comprehensive and 
complete body of ethnic entrepreneur theory.  
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Personal 
 
Please answer the following questions describing yourself. Your responses to these questions will 
NOT be released to anyone on any individual basis. 
 
1) Are you male or female?   male   /   female 
 
2) Did you immigrate to the United States?   Yes  / No 
2a) If YES, how many years ago?_____ 
2b) What is your current immigration status (i.e. citizen, green-cardholder, noncitizen)? ___________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3) What is your highest level of formal education?_________________________________________ 
 
4) Please, name the institution/s and place/s where you got your post high-school education 
 
 _________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5) How long have you been living in the Boston region?____________________________________ 
 
6) Did you have a regular job in a high-technology sector, before launching your own firm? Yes / No 
6a)  Did you have a regular job in the Boston high-technology sector?  Yes / No 
 
Your Firm 
 
7) What year did you launch your firm?_____  
 
8) What was the most important factor when deciding where to locate your firm (refering to the 
current location of your firm)?_________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9) How many employees do you have today?_____  
 
10) Which of the following activities (if any) have occured within your firm? (Check all that apply) 
_____Technological alterations of a product 
_____Technological alterations in any process  
_____The development of a new product 
_____The development of a new service 
_____Radical innovation (meaning a radical change that transforms the current supply and demand 
pattern)  
 
11) Which of the following activities (if any) continuesly occur in your firm? (Check all that apply) 
_____Technological alterations of a product 
_____Technological alterations in any process  
_____The development of a new product 
_____The development of a new service 
_____Radical innovation (meaning a radical change that transforms the current supply and demand 
pattern)  
 
12) Please rate the level of sophistication of the technology at use in your firm, on a daily basis. Circle 
one of the numbers below where one equals ’simple’ and six equals ’exceptionally advanced’. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Contacts 
 
All entrepreneurs make use of some kind of contacts (i.e suppliers, other firms, institutions, trade 
organisations, or individuals like friends, family and previous collegues) when running their firm. 
When answering the following questions, think about the relations that are important for the daily 
operations of your firm, or the contacts that have been crucial in a specific situation/ phase of your 
firm. You should include your regional and national ties as well as your global (if any) connections. 
If your contact is a representative of an organization, institution or firm, please list both the initials of 
the person and his/her affiliation. 
 
13) First we will focus on the contacts that you retrieve information from (i.e. information on 
prospective employees, new clients, new technology, new products, new markets etc). Please list 5 of 
your regional, national or global contacts that are/have been most important to your firm. If there are 
less than 5, answer for as many as appropriate. Use initials of the person and (if applicable) the name 
of the organization.                                   
A)_______________________________________________________________________________  
 
B)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
C)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
E)________________________________________________________________________________    
 
14) I could mention more than 5 information contacts (Circle one):  Yes No   
 
Now, keep this list in mind as you answer questions no 15-19. 
 
15) Please circle the race/ethnicity that best describes each person on your list. Circle one for each 
person, and specify if you choose the category ”other”    
A) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________   
B) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
C) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
D) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
E) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
 
 
16) What was your initial relationship to the contacts on your list? (i.e. a relative, friend, university 
mate, collegue, business contact etc) 
A)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
B)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
C)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
E)________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix 1 
 122 
 
17) Please state whether the people/organizations on your list are regional, national or global contacts. 
If national, please specify the state where your contact resiedes. If global, please specify the country.    
 Regional  National:State  Global: Country   
A)______________________________________________________________________________    
 
B)______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
C)______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D)______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
E)______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18) How often do you interact with the persons on your list. Circle the best answer for each. 
A) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year     
B) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
C) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
D) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
E) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
 
19) Please state how long you have known or been connected to the persons/ organizations on your 
list. 
A)__________ 
B)__________ 
C)__________ 
D)__________ 
E)__________ 
 
20) The following questions ask how well each pair of people on your list know each other, to the best 
of your knowledge. Check one answer for each 
    not at all  some  very well 
Person A and B know each other:_______________________________________________________  
Person A and C know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person A and D know each other:______________________________________________________     
Person A and E know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person B and C know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person B and D know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person B and E know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person C and D know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person C and E know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
Person D and E know each other:_______________________________________________________ 
 
21) Following a similar pattern of questions as above, we will now focus on your contacts that equip 
you and your firm with physical resources (i.e. suppliers, financial capital etc.). Please list 3 contacts 
that in some way supply you with physical resources. If there are less than 3, answer for as many as 
appropriate. If applicable, you may also list a contact that you have already mentioned under 
information contacts. Again, use the initials of the person and (if applicable) his/her affiliation . 
 
F)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
G)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
H)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Now, keep this list in mind as you answer questions no 22-26. 
 
22) Please circle the race/ethnicity that best describes each person on your list. Circle one for each 
person, and specify if you choose the category ”other”    
F) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________   
G) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
H) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
  
23) What was your initial relationship to the contacts on your list? (i.e. a relative, friend, university 
mate, collegue, business contact etc.) 
F)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
G)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
H)_______________________________________________________________________________  
 
24) Please state whether the people/organizations on your list are regional, national or global contacts. 
If national, please specify the state where your contact resides. If global, please specify the country.    
  
Regional   National: State  Global: Country   
F)________________________________________________________________________________
     
G)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
H)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25) How often do you interact with the persons on your list. Circle the best answer for each. 
F) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year     
G) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
H) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
 
26) Please state how long you have known or been connected to the persons/organizations on your list 
F)__________ 
G)__________ 
H)__________ 
 
Repeating the pattern of questions again, I will now ask you about your contacts relating to 
innovative activity. Innovative activity refers to alterations in products or processes, the development 
of a new product or service, or radical change that transforms the current supply and demand pattern. 
As before, you may list a contact that you have already mentioned. Please use the initials of the 
person and (if applicable) his/her affiliation. If there are less than 3, answer for as many as 
appropriate. If non of these activities occur in your firm, you can proceed to question number 33.  
 
27) Please list 3 contacts that you collaborate with, or have cooperated with, regarding innovative 
activity.    
I)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
J)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
K)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Now, keep this list in mind as you answer question no 28-32. 
 
28) Please circle the race/ethnicity that best describes each person on your list. Circle one for each 
person, and specify if you choose the category ”other”    
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I) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________   
J) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
K) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
  
29) What was your initial relationship to the contacts on your list? (i.e. a relative, friend, university 
mate, collegue, business contact etc) 
I)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
J)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
K)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
30) Please state whether the people/organizations on your list are regional, national or global contacts. 
If national, please specify the state where your contact resiedes. If global, please specify the country.    
 Regional  National: State  Global: Country   
I)______________________________________________________________________________     
 
J)______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
K)______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
31) How often do you interact with the persons on your list. Circle the best answer for each. 
I) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year     
J) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
K) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
 
32) Please state how long you have known or been connected to the persons/organizations on your list 
I)___________ 
J)___________ 
K)__________ 
 
Finally, I will ask you about your supportive contacts (i.e. individuals or organizations that offer 
advice, guidence, encouragement etc.). You may again, list a contact that you have already 
mentioned. Please use the initials of the person and (if applicable) his/her affiliation. If there are less 
than 2, answer for as many as appropriate.  
 
33) Please list 2 contacts that you gain support from  
L)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
M)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Now, keep this list in mind as you answer question no 35-39 
 
34) Please circle the race/ethnicity that best describes each person on your list. Circle one for each 
person, and specify if you choose the category ”other”    
L) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________   
M) Asian Indian Other Asian White  Other________________________ 
 
35) What was your initial relationship to the contacts on your list? (i.e. a relative, friend, university 
mate, collegue, business contact etc) 
L)________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
M)_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
36) Please state whether the people/organizations on your list are regional, national or global contacts. 
If national, please specify the state where your contact resiedes. If global, please specify the country.    
 Regional  National:State  Global: Country   
L)_____________________________________________________________________________     
 
M)_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
37) How often do you interact with the persons on your list. Circle the best answer for each. 
L) weekly  monthly  once every 6 months  once a year     
M) weekly monthly  once every 6 months  once a year 
 
38) Please state how long you have known or been connected to the persons/organizations on your 
list. 
L)__________ 
M)__________ 
 
 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE – Thank you for your time and cooperation! 
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Interview Protocol 
 
Explorative Topics that Followed up on the Entrepreneurs’ Responses to the 
Questionnaire 
1) The background of the entrepreneur 
 
2) The reasons behind starting a firm, in this specific technology, in this specific place. 
 
3) The specific characteristics of selected connections and the ethnicity of the ties 
 
4) The ties to other high-tech areas in the US 
 
5) The ties to India. The reason behind developing ties to India 
 
6) The relation between local and national/global ties 
 
7) The relation between white and co-ethnic/multiethnic ties 
 
Specific Questions 
1) I want you to think back to the early growth period of your firm (the first two years), 
can you explain how you developed some connections for your firm? (For example to 
suppliers, clients, recruitment channels, trade organizations, information etc.) 
 
2) If you think back to the early growth period of your firm, how did you experience the  
development of connections? Why do you think you experienced it that way? 
 
3) If you, again, think back to the early growth period of your firm, what kinds of skills, 
background or experience were particularly important when developing some first 
connections for your firm?     
 
4) You launched your firm in 19... . What was the attitude towards minority business in  
Boston at that point?  
 
5) Would you describe Boston’s contemporary high-tech environment as receptive to 
minority business? 
 
6) If you hade to mention the most severe impediments/hindrances that you faced when 
developing your connections, what would they be? 
 
7) Do you think that you have been confronted with skeptisism due to your minority 
status? If yes, please give an example. 
 
8) If NO, Why do you think that you have never experienced any discrimination? 
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9) Do you think that other minority entrepreneurs in the high-tech sector have 
experienced any discrimination?   
 
10) What kind of skill, background, experience was most important for you when 
developing ties to individuals in the Boston high-tech milieu?   
 
11) What kind of advice would you give an Indian entrepreneur setting up a firm in the 
area and who is in the process of developing a network for his firm? 
 
12) If you had to mention the three most important prerequisites for starting a high-tech 
firm, what would they be? 
Appendix 3 
 126
Industry White Asians Black-Am. Pacific Isl. Native Am. Other Race Total 
        
Computers/Hardware 85      85 
Electrical Equipment 706 34 35   17 792 
Transportation 140      140 
Instruments 601      601 
Tele-communications       0 
Engineering services 15559 612 272 21 78 43 16585 
Software 5206 168 208  10 88 5680 
Total 22297 814 515 21 88 148 23883 
Standard error 842 161 127 * 53 69  
*According to the US 
Census, numbers under 50 
are too small to be reliable        
 
 
 
 Indian Chinese Japanese Korean 
Asian 
Other Total 
Industry       
       
Computers/Hardware      0 
Electrical Equipment 24 10    34 
Transportation      0 
Instruments      0 
Tele-communications      0 
Engineering services 107 271 133 37 64 612 
Software 50 84   34 168 
Total 181 365 133 37 98 814 
Standard Error 75 108 65 * 56  
*According to the US 
Census, numbers under 50 
are too small to be reliable       
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Tabulations of the US Census 2000 datafiles 
 
Errors in Data 
Statistics in the US census 2000 datafiles are based on a sample. Therefore, they may 
differ somewhat from the 100% figures that would have been obtained if all housing 
units, people within those housing units, and people living within group quarters had 
been enumerated using the same questionnaires, instructions, enumerators, and so forth. 
The sample estimate also would differ from other samples of housing units, people within 
those housing units, and people living in quarters. The deviasion of a sample estimate 
from the average of all possible samples is called the sampling error. The standard error 
of a sample estimate is a measure of the variation among the estimates from all possible 
samples. Thus, it meassures the precision with which an estimate from a particular 
sample approximates the average result of all possible samples. The sample estimate and 
its estimated standard error permit the construction of interval estimates with prescribed 
confidence that the interval includes the average result of all possible samples.  
 In addition to the variability that arises from the sampling procedures, sample data 
is subject to non-sampling error. This includes errors such as nonresponse errors, 
respondent and enumerator errors and processing errors. Non-sampling error may affect 
the data in two ways: errors that are introduced randomly will increase the variability of 
the data and, therefore, should be reflected in the standard error; errors that tend to be 
consistent in one direction will make sample data biased in that direction. For example, if 
respondents consistently tend to underreport their incomes, then the resulting counts of 
households or families by income category will tend to be understated for the higher 
income categories and overstated for the lower income categories. Such systematic biases 
are not reflected in the standard error. However, a number of techniques were 
implemented during the census planning and development stages to reduce various types 
of non-sampling errors. Quality assurance methods were used throughout the data 
collection and processing phases of the census to improve the quality of the data. In 
addition, the census bureau implemented a reinterview program to minimize errors in the 
datacollection phase for enumerator-filled questionnaires (US Census bureau’s technical 
documentation 2000). 
 
Producing Tabulations 
In order to produce estimates of the ethnic composition of high-tech entreprenerus in the 
Boston Metropolitan, I simply made cross-tabulations of the appropriate variables and 
added the weights of all persons that possessed the characteristic of interest. To create 
person estimates, I used the ‘person weight’. The following variables were recoded and 
employed in the cross-tabulations: 
 
Race21 was recoded into: White2 (1), Chinese (40), Asian Indian (37), Japanese (45), 
Korean (46) and Other Asian (38, 39, 41-44, 47-54). The other races were classified as 
‘not in universe’. 
 
                                                 
1 Hispanics are not included in the US Census variable Race2. However, since Hispanics have little to no 
impact in the high-tech industries, it does not significantly alter the total number of high-tech entrepreneurs.   
2 The numbers correspond to labels used in the variables in the US Census data file 2000. 
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Race2 was recoded into: Asian (37-55), Black American (2), Native American (3-18, 21-
36), Pacific Islander (56-63) and White (1). The other ethnicities were classified as ‘not 
in universe’. 
 
IndNAICS (Industry codes) was recoded into: Computers (3341), Electrical equipment 
(333M, 334M1, 334M2, 3352, 335M), Engineering Services (5413, 5416, 5417, 5419Z), 
Instruments (325M, 3345, 3391), Software (5112, 5141Z, 5142, 5415, 8112), Tele-
commuications (51331, 5133Z), and Transportation (336M, 33641M1, 33641M2, 3365, 
3366, 3369). The other NAICS industry codes were classified as ‘not in universe’. 
 
Clwkr (class of worker) was recoded into self-employed (6,7). The other classes of 
workers were classified as ‘not in universe’. 
 
PUMA5 (Public Use Microdata Area) Designates area of 100 000 or more population. 
Following the US census definition for the Boston Metropolitan Area I recoded the 
appropriate areas into the variable ‘Boston Metropolitan Area’. The following area codes 
were included: 400, 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2400, 2500, 2600, 2700, 2800, 
2900, 3000, 3100, 3200, 3301, 3302, 3303, 3304, 3305, 3400, 3500, 3600, 3700, 3800, 
3900, 4200, 4300, 4600.   
      
The NAICS codes were singled out based on DeVol’s (1999) definition of high-
technology industries. However, I had to recode DeVol’s older SIC codes into the new 
classification system of NAICS codes. For this purpose, I used the US Census Bureau’s 
convertion tables which may be found on www.census.gov. Since the US Census data file 
do not operate with the full list of NAICS codes, I in some instances hade to choose the 
best fitting code and in other situations exclude an appropriate code. However, at an 
aggregate level, my selection of NAICS codes do represent industries that are 
characterized by a high degree of technological sophistication, large R&D expenditures 
and capacities, a high patent and innovation intensity and industries that have a 
substantial technological impact on other economic sectors, recommended by DeVol 
(1999). 
 
Calculating Standard Errors 
In order to calculate standard errrors for the estimates I used the following formula: 
                 
 
SE(Ŷ) =       19 (Ŷ) (1- Ŷ/N)  
 
Ŷ = the weighted estimate 
N=  the sum of the PUMS weights for all people in the geographic area 
 
The basic standard error was then multiplied by the design factor of the appropriate 
variable, derived from US Census bureau’s technical documentation file. If many 
variables were used in the tabulations, the US Census bureau recomends to use the 
highest design factor. Accordingly, I used the design factor 1.3 for the variable ‘Class of 
Worker.                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
